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FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND TRIBAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN THE SELF-DETERMINATION ERA
Samuel E. Ennis * & Caroline P. Mayhew**
I. Introduction
On March 7, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA). 1 Section 904 of
the VAWA expressly affirmed Indian tribes’ inherent criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians for crimes of domestic violence or dating violence, as well
as criminal violations of certain protection orders that occur in Indian
country. 2 As the first recognition of tribal criminal authority over nonIndians since the Supreme Court extinguished such jurisdiction in 1978,3
section 904 was hailed as a victory by tribal advocates 4 and represents a
major development in federal Indian law’s treatment of and interaction with
tribal law and tribal justice systems.
As sharply illustrated in the VAWA, however, federal Indian law
appears to be accelerating in a direction that simultaneously supports the
development of robust, contemporary tribal law — a goal closely aligned
with the current stated federal policy of Indian self-determination and selfgovernance — and also cautiously seeks to align tribal judicial exercise
more closely with American state and federal practices. Even in taking the
* Associate Attorney, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry, LLP. Mr.
Ennis would like to thank Reid Peyton Chambers and Colin Cloud Hampson for their
insightful review and edits and Caroline Mayhew for her dedication and excellent writing.
The views expressed by the author do not reflect those of Sonosky, Chambers law firm, its
attorneys, or any of its clients.
** Associate, Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, LLP. The views expressed by the author
do not reflect those of Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
1. Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013).
2. Id. tit. IX, § 904, 127 Stat. at 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. I 2013))
(adding section 204 to title II of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(1968)). For a discussion of the importance of Congress affirming inherent tribal criminal
jurisdiction, rather than attempting to confer it initially by statute, see Samuel E. Ennis,
Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An
Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553, 601-04 (2009).
3. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For a general discussion
of jurisdiction in Indian country, see infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, House Passes Violence
Against Women Act (Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2013/
02/28/house-passes-violence-against-women-act.
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monumental step of acknowledging tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in
section 904, Congress was influenced by the opposition of some politicians 5
and scholars 6 to any expansion of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians,
and their concerns over the constitutionality and inherent legitimacy of
tribal judiciaries.7 As a result, Congress qualified its support for tribal
jurisdictional expansion under the VAWA: tribes wishing to exercise
VAWA’s expanded jurisdictional authority must adopt certain legal
safeguards that provide non-Indian defendants with federal Constitutional
protections exceeding those that tribes must provide to most Indian
defendants under federal law. 8 Thus, the hard-won and well-deserved
victory of expanded jurisdictional authority under the VAWA came at the
price of stringent and expensive requirements on tribal judicial systems and
the potential further “Westernization” of tribal courts.9

5. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Consideration of the Violence
Against Women Act (Feb. 4, 2013) (arguing that VAWA “raises serious constitutional questions
concerning both the sovereignty of tribal courts and the constitutional rights of defendants who
would be tried in those courts”), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/consideration-violence-against-women-act-0.
6. See, e.g., Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be
Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC.
GROUPS, July 2012, at 40, 44 (arguing that that expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction “would
subject non-Indian citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional sovereign to which they
had not previously been subject, and where the customary guarantees of federal
constitutional protections may be questioned”).
7. See, e.g., Senator Slade Gorton, Equal Justice for Indians, Too, WASH. POST, Sept.
16, 1997, at A-17 (arguing against the impartiality of tribal courts); DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN
& CHRISTINA VILLEGAS, HERITAGE FOUND., BACKGROUNDER NO. 2673, THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT: REAUTHORIZATION FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED (Mar. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/the-violence-against-womenact-reauthorization-fundamentally-flawed; David Wolitz, Criminal Jurisdiction and the
Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OR. L. REV. 725, 766 (2013) (noting that the
“reality and perception that tribal justice is too often unreliable, unfair, and immune to
fundamental rights review undermines confidence in the tribe’s jurisdiction — and makes
widening the functional jurisdiction of tribes an uphill climb”).
8. Pilot Project for Tribal Jurisdiction Over Crimes of Domestic Violence, 78 Fed.
Reg. 35,961, 35,962 (June 14, 2013) [hereinafter Pilot Project Notice].
9. Indeed, tribes have almost uniformly reported severe funding difficulties in
implementing the legal protections that must be extended to non-Indian defendants in tribal
courts. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT: NONE OF
THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING AUTHORITY, AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 3
(May 30, 2012) (finding that anywhere from 64% to 96% of 109 surveyed tribes did not
have the necessary resources to do so).
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In a very practical way, federal Indian law — including legislation like
the VAWA, but also federal common law and executive policy — matters
to tribal law and legal systems. While tribes may choose to operate justice
systems that serve community needs without regard to federal
acknowledgment or enforcement, tribal justice systems feel the influence of
the federal model; in the words of one tribal judge: “[tribal] courts do not
do their work in isolation. [They] need important questions of law settled,
jurisdictional questions, questions of choice of law, questions of full faith
and credit and comity, issues of the trust responsibility, and the internal
tribal law itself, which can be complex of its own.” 10 That is to say, tribal
legal decisions are not rendered in a vacuum, and tribal courts require
respect and partnership from the state and federal courts in order for tribes
to fully embrace their rightful partnership as the “third sovereign” in the
United States. 11
In this article, we consider these “important questions of law” —
questions of jurisdiction, federal statutory law, comity, tribal choice of law
and application of tribal law, primarily in the context of criminal law.
Inspired by the VAWA, we explore the ways in which federal Indian law
has simultaneously encouraged the development of tribal law by offering
explicit recognition of tribal authority and essential resources for
development, while also seeking to shape the exercise of tribal law by
attaching conditions on that recognition and access. At the heart of this
inquiry is the intersection of the federal government’s encouragement of
tribal self-governance with the competing pressures of federal Indian law.
For decades, the United States has recognized “its commitment to the
maintenance of the federal government’s unique and continuing
relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the
Indian people as a whole.” 12 The Supreme Court has likewise “repeatedly
recognized the federal government’s longstanding policy of encouraging
tribal self-government” and that tribal courts “play a vital role in tribal self10. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Native Am. Affairs of the Comm. on Natural Res.
on H.R. 1268, to Assist the Development of Tribal Judicial Systems, and for Other Purposes,
103d Cong. 67 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1268] (statement of Hon. Carey Vicenti,
Chief Judge of the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court).
11. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (2012); accord Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the
Federal Trust Responsibility with Self-Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on
Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, in NATURAL
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY ch. 13A (Rocky Mountain Min. L. Found.
Special, Nov. 2005) (chronicling executive progression on Indian self-determination).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

424

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

government” 13 Yet as tribes struggle to create culturally representative
tribal judiciaries that reflect tribal norms and values, and dispense justice in
accordance with tribal tradition, federal Indian law concurrently pushes
tribal judiciaries closer towards the federal constitutional system and
towards becoming “mirror images of the dominant society.” 14
This article will review several specific ways in which federal Indian law
simultaneously acts to strengthen and encourage the development of tribal
law in the criminal context while also seeking to influence its trajectory and
even constrain it in certain ways. In Part II we review the background
principles of self-governance that have shaped federal Indian law policy
since the 1970s, and set out the criminal jurisdiction scheme in Indian
country. Largely a product of federal common law, tribal court criminal
jurisdiction facilitates a close relationship between federal and tribal law
and creates ready opportunities for federal law, in its various forms, to seek
to influence tribal law through a carrot-and-stick approach. As such, an
understanding of the jurisdictional scheme serves as a useful backdrop for
Part III, in which we consider three distinct methods by which federal law
undertakes this effort: (1) congressional legislation; (2) federal funding
choices; and (3) comity as it is employed by the courts to recognize and
enforce tribal judgments.
In Part IV, we turn from federal to tribal law and explore how tribes
themselves negotiate the realities and complications of the self-governance
opportunities provided under federal Indian law and operate their own
criminal justice systems. In order to consider the goals and effects of
federal law in a different light, we begin with an overview of one tribal
system that, as much as any other, has focused on maintaining cultural
distinction in the face of an overarching federal presence: the Judicial
Branch of the Navajo Nation. We then broaden our analysis with an
overview of how tribal courts more generally have applied tribal law in
light of the federal system with which they must coexist. The final analysis
raises questions about the basis for the pro-federal approach embodied in
statutes like the VAWA, and whether or not that approach is likely to meet
federal policy goals and best serve tribal or public interests.

13. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
14. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 836
(2007); cf. Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and Indian Adjudication: An Essay on
the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 594, 596 (1985)
(expressing concern that tribal exercise of inherent sovereignty may “too starkly challenge
western notions of democratic self-government” to gain traction).
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II. Backdrop Principles and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
A. Federal Principles of Tribal Governance
Any examination of the relationship between federal Indian law and the
internal development of tribal law must be understood in the context of the
two overarching principles that, at least in theory, govern the relationship
between Congress and Indian tribes: the trust responsibility and the selfgovernance policy.
In its most basic form, the federal trust responsibility toward Indian
tribes stems from the seminal Indian law case of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 15 where the Court held the Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign
state” as understood in Article III of the Constitution. Rather, the tribes
were “more correctly . . . denominated domestic dependent nations,”16 and
in the words of Chief Justice Marshall “[t]heir relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.” 17 This relationship, now known
as the trust responsibility, “recognizes a sort of ‘protectorate’ status in the
tribes, securing to them the power of managing their internal affairs in an
autonomous manner,” as well as recognizing “a federal duty to protect the
tribe’s land and resource base.” 18 It is a legal obligation under which the
United States “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust” toward Indian tribes. 19
The trust responsibility is a guiding principle for the relationship
between Congress and the tribes, 20 providing impetus for legislation
furthering, among other issues, Indian education,21 health care, 22 and self15. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id.
18. Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (1975).
19. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
20. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(3)(a) (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012) (“[F]ederal action toward Indians as expressed in treaties,
agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative regulations is construed in light of
the trust responsibility. As a result, the trust relationship is one of the primary cornerstones
of Indian law.”).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (“It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal
Government’s unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian
people for the education of Indian children.”)
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (2012) (“Federal health services to maintain and improve the
health of the Indians are consonant with and required by the Federal Government’s historical
and unique legal relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian
people.”).
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governance. 23 The federal trust relationship recognizes the unique
responsibilities that the federal government owes to Indian tribes due to
their “domestic dependent” status and encourages federal facilitation of the
development of tribal institutions and infrastructure. Some scholars
accordingly argue “[t]ribes operating an Anglo-American adversary system
should insist on training opportunities and funding for court personnel as
essential to a just system” as “[t]raining, funding, and an independent tribal
defense organization are all requirements of a just system, and all are
perspicuously encompassed under the federal trust responsibility.” 24
The second prong of this relationship is the federal government’s policy
of supporting tribal self-governance. This policy was promulgated in direct
response to the so-called Termination Era of the 1940s and 1950s, during
which “Congress moved to withdraw responsibility for a number of Indian
tribes, along with it recognition of their special legal status; attempted to
extend state jurisdiction over many more tribes; and ultimately sought to
assimilate all Indians into the broader polity.” 25 Recognizing the disastrous
effect of the Termination Era on tribal culture and on the very existence of
tribes themselves, since the late 1960s the United States has expressly
pursued a policy of “self-determination” for Indian tribes and communities.
This policy envisions federal backing of robust tribal governments,
increased economic self-sufficiency, and tribal control over tribal programs
and territory. 26
The self-determination policy has manifested itself in a number of ways
in the context of tribal judiciaries. Perhaps most importantly, in 1975,
Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance

23. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4 (2012).
24. Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of a Crime: A Tribal
and Congressional Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 358 (2013).
25. Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Equality, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2011).
26. See, e.g., Presidential Message to Congress on January 24, 1983, 19 WEEKLY CONG.
PRESS DOC. 99 (1983); see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000)
(recognizing “the right of Indian tribes to self-government” and supporting “tribal
sovereignty and self-determination”); Presidential Statement Reaffirming the Governmentto-Government Relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribal
Governments, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 936 (June 14, 1991); Proclamation No. 7500,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,641 (Nov. 12, 2001) (noting that the United States “will protect and honor
tribal sovereignty and help to stimulate economic development in reservation
communities”); Exec. Order No. 13647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (June 26, 2013) (establishing
White House Council on Native American Affairs).
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Act (ISDEAA), 27 which authorizes tribes to assume responsibility for the
operation of various federal programs in place of federal agencies such as
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service, including the
operation of tribal law enforcement entities. The Supreme Court has
recognized principles of self-determination require parties to exhaust all
tribal court remedies before challenging the tribe’s subject matter
jurisdiction in federal courts, 28 and Congress has stated “enhancing tribal
court systems and improving access to those systems serves the dual
Federal goals of tribal political self-determination and economic selfsufficiency.” 29 In their roles as arbiters of their own jurisdiction and the
primary interpreter of tribal law and policy, tribal courts truly are “frontline
institutions that most often confront issues of American Indian selfdetermination and sovereignty.” 30
The trust responsibility and the federal policy of encouraging tribal selfgovernance provide an important pro-tribal backdrop to the relationship
between Congress, the federal courts, and the tribes. Through the repeated
federal affirmation of these principles, tribes, at least in the abstract, should
expect a certain level of political and legal autonomy to develop the
parameters of tribal law, determine tribal jurisdictional limitations under
both tribal law and any overarching federal framework, and to develop a
robust, culturally-specific body of tribal common law.
B. Foundational Jurisdictional Principles
The core of “federal Indian law” is the recognition of the right of Indian
tribes to “make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 31 Congruent with
that basic notion, the development of modern federal Indian law relating
specifically to tribal courts and their jurisdiction within Indian country 32
27. Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 2, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 450 et seq.).
28. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 3651(7) (2012).
30. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts: Providers of Justice and Protectors of
Sovereignty, 79 JUDICATURE 110, 110 (1995).
31. Williams v. Lee, 538 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
32. For the purposes of this determination, the phrase “Indian country” includes (a) any
Indian reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian title to which has not been extinguished. 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). “Dependent Indian communities” generally refers to Alaska Native
Villages that are (1) located on land set aside for the tribe and (2) both the land and the tribe
are under the superintendence of the federal government. See generally Alaska v. Native
Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). The “Indian allotments” clause
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begins with the premise that, as pre-constitutional sovereign entities, Indian
tribes are not subject to the Constitution of the United States.33 Since Indian
tribes “did not participate in the Constitutional Convention and did not
‘sign on’ by joining the federal union,” 34 they are not bound by the
Constitution, absent affirmative congressional action to the contrary. 35
Rather, federal and state courts have recognized that tribal courts generally
retain inherent civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations by
virtue of their sovereign status.36
At times, however, the federal courts have rejected tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over tribal territories.37 The subsequent convoluted evolution of
this area of the law — which has famously led scholars to refer to the
jurisdictional scheme governing Indian country as a “maze” 38 — has tied
federal and tribal law together almost by necessity. Because the
jurisdictional scheme lays the groundwork for the relationship between
federal Indian law and tribal we turn now to an overview of the federal,
state, and tribal law governing Indian country.

generally refers to Indian lands located in reservations that kept their tribal trust status
despite having been allotted to non-Indians by the federal government in the late 1800s.
33. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); accord Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have
historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”)
34. United States v. Red Bird, 146 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D.S.D. 2001) (noting that
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments did not apply of their own force to Indian tribes).
35. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384 (“But the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the
manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised does not render
such local powers Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the United
States.”).
36. See United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 713 n.5 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Indian tribes,
although limited sovereigns, have retained the right to try and punish individuals who
transgress their laws. This right is not derived from the federal government but is inherent in
the tribes’ sovereignty.”).
37. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978) (finding
that “that Indian tribes, although fully subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States,
[do not] retain the power to try non-Indians according to their own customs and procedure”).
38. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976).
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C. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Congress began expanding federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country
as early as the late eighteenth century. 39 Most notably, the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1834 40 applied federal criminal law to Indian country,
but excluded “crimes committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian” in recognition of the fact that “the tribes have
exclusive jurisdiction” of such offenses and “we can [not] with any justice
or propriety extend our laws to” them. 41 These provisions were reauthorized
and clarified in 1948 with the passage of the Indian General Crimes Act
(GCA), 42 which generally extended to Indian country the same federal
criminal jurisdiction exercised in other “federal enclaves.” 43 However, the
GCA explicitly reserves tribal court jurisdiction over non-federal crimes 44
committed in Indian country and solely involving Indians.45
This latter provision came under scrutiny in 1883 when the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Ex parte Crow Dog that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction over the murder of one Indian by another. 46 Congress
subsequently passed the Major Crimes Act (MCA) 47 in 1885, 48 which
39. At the time, this did not include Indians, who were not granted full U.S. citizenship
until 1924. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)).
40. Ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (1834).
41. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 23474, at 13 (1834)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
43. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1992).
The federal enclave laws are a group of statutes that permits the federal courts
to serve as a forum for the prosecution of certain crimes when they occur
within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, 18
U.S.C. § 7; this jurisdiction includes federal land, and property such as federal
courthouses and military bases.
Id. at 797.
44. In the event that there is no federal law controlling for a crime committed in a
federal enclave, the GCA incorporates the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012),
which authorizes the federal government to apply state definitions and sentencing guidelines
for crimes occurring in federal enclaves. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2012).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (“This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe . . . .”).
46. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
48. See Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal
Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 192-93 n.4 (1989).
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establishes concurrent federal criminal and tribal jurisdiction over fourteen
“major” crimes when committed by an Indian in Indian country. 49
Discussed in greater detail infra, a second statute, the Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA), restricts tribal criminal sentencing in such cases to, at
maximum, three years in jail and a $15,000 fine, or both. 50 These limits on
tribal prosecutorial and sentencing authority, combined with limited tribal
resources for detention facilities, result in the United States federal
government often being the primary sovereign exercising jurisdiction over
the prosecution of major crimes in Indian country and the subsequent
incarceration of on-reservation offenders.
D. State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Until the 1950s, state court jurisdiction in Indian country was generally
limited to crimes committed by non-Indians that were either victimless
(such as vandalism) or else committed against another non-Indian. 51 But in
1953, Congress passed Public Law 280, which required certain state
governments to assume what would otherwise be federal criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country. 52 Congress also authorized other “nonmandatory” states to opt-in to Public Law 280; initially these states could
do so at their own discretion, but since the passage of ICRA, states have
been required to obtain consent from tribes with reservations within the
state before extending their jurisdiction into Indian country under Public
Law 280. 53 Public Law 280 states currently assert the criminal jurisdiction
49. These fourteen crimes are murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony
under chapter 109A [crimes of sexual abuse], incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, an assault against
an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, felony child abuse or neglect,
arson, burglary, and robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
50. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C) (2012).
51. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882). In addition, Congress authorized
certain states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over certain reservations. See, e.g., Act of
June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (granting the state of Iowa criminal jurisdiction over
the Sac and Fox Reservation); Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (granting Kansas
criminal jurisdiction over in-state reservations); 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2012) (granting New York
criminal jurisdiction over in-state reservations).
52. Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 588-60, (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2012)) (mandatory states). These “mandatory states” are Alaska (except the
Annette Islands with regard to the Metlakatla Indians), California, Minnesota (except the
Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), and
Wisconsin. Id.
53. See 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012). These so-called “optional states” are Nevada, South
Dakota, Washington, Florida, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Arizona, Iowa, and Utah,
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which would have otherwise been exercised by the federal government,
though tribal criminal jurisdiction remains the same as in non-Public Law
280 states. 54
E. Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
Pursuant to tribal law, as well as the settled federal legal principle that
Indian tribes retain all sovereign powers not expressly abrogated by
Congress, 55 certain tribes did historically criminally prosecute and try nonIndians. 56 But in 1978, the Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe that Indian tribes “do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and
to punish non-Indians.” 57 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist held
that such jurisdiction was “inconsistent with [tribes’] status” as a result of
the “intrinsic limitations on Indian tribal authority” stemming from the
overarching sovereignty of the United States and the comparative
diminution in tribal sovereignty. 58 This doctrine has since been categorized
as an “implicit divestiture of sovereignty” 59 and summarized as a judicial
analysis of “whether tribes have legitimate local interests implemented by
appropriate lawmaking and law-applying procedures and institutions that
transcend the interests of outsiders to be free from tribal authority.” 60

although the optional states often only assume jurisdiction over certain reservations when instate tribes reject the assumption of state authority. See Carole Goldberg & Duane
Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38
CONN. L. REV. 697, 699-01 (2006).
54. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 (1976); Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672
(8th Cir. 1990).
55. Merion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 139 (1982).
56. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) (noting that
“of the 127 reservation court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the
United States, 33 purport to extend that jurisdiction to non-Indians”); J. Matthew Martin,
The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by the Cherokee Supreme
Court, 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 27, 50 n.195 (2009) (discussing Cherokee
prosecutions of non-Indians in the early nineteenth century).
57. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
58. Id. at 208-09.
59. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
60. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Non-Members, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 71 (1999). For
an in-depth examination of the development of the implicit divestiture doctrine, see Samuel
E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the Indian
Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 627-49 (2011).
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In 1990, the Supreme Court further narrowed tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-tribal members when it held in Duro v. Reina 61 that the Oliphant
Court’s prohibition on tribal court prosecutions of non-Indians also applied
to Indians not actually enrolled in the prosecuting tribe. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion centered on the fact that non-member Indians had not
“consented” to tribal court jurisdiction, in that they could not vote in tribal
elections and were frequently unfamiliar with the language, customs, and
cultural legal norms of the prosecuting tribes, 62 a line of reasoning that has
since been dubbed “the consent theory.” 63
In order to address jurisdictional confusion in the aftermath of the Duro
ruling, Congress quickly passed the so-called Duro Fix, which reaffirmed
tribes do have inherent criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, and not just
tribal members. 64 In United States v. Lara, 65 the Supreme Court upheld the
statute, holding the Duro Fix reflects Congress’s “constitutional power to
relax restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on the
exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority,” 66 and that separate
prosecutions by tribal and federal authorities for the same crime did not
violate double jeopardy. 67 However, aside from the limited jurisdictional
expansion under VAWA, federal law continues to prohibit tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Over time, federal statutes and
common law have expanded the federal and state presence in Indian
country, while paring back the scope of acknowledged tribal authority.

61. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
62. Id. at 693; see also David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s
Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV.
267, 297-98 (2001) (“This rhetoric suggests that some members of the Court question the
competence and fairness of Indian courts and governments, are troubled by the separatism
and special rights of Indians and their impact on non-Indians, or see the operation of tribal
governments as anomalous in a federal system.”).
63. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 973, 990-94 (2010).
64. Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(d), 104 Stat. 1856, 1893 (1990). (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)) (adding the clause “the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians” to the definition
of “powers of self-government”).
65. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
66. Id. at 196.
67. Id. at 210. The Duro Fix has since been upheld in the face of equal protection and
due process challenges, as well. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 952 (2006).
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III. The Carrot and the Stick: Developmental Encouragement for, and
Restrictions on, Tribal Law
Stepping into the unusual space created by the federal Indian law
jurisdictional scheme, the federal government has been able to amplify its
influence over the development and application of tribal criminal law.
Specifically, through at least three powerful mechanisms, federal Indian
law takes advantage of claimed congressional plenary power over tribal
criminal jurisdiction to simultaneously support and encourage the exercise
of tribal law, while also seeking to encourage its compliance with standard
federal and state practices. This Part is devoted to a discussion of these
three mechanisms: legislative affirmation and limitation of tribal court
jurisdiction, federal funding choices, and comity in non-tribal courts.
A. Legislative Affirmation, and Limitation, of Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Insofar as they are not constitutionally based, Congress can patch the
gaps created by federal common law in acknowledged tribal court
jurisdiction. This plenary congressional power therefore, offers federal
lawmakers the opportunity to significantly influence the development of
tribal law by controlling legislation that could partially reverse those limits.
Accordingly, legislative regulation of tribal court jurisdiction is perhaps the
most direct way that federal Indian law acts in relationship to tribal law.
The Indian Civil Rights Act — likely the single piece of federal
legislation with the greatest direct influence on the development and
application of tribal criminal law in practice — illustrates this principle
quite well. Two more recent federal statutes: the Tribal Law and Order Act
and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, also
illustrate this principle. These statutes exemplify the inherent paradox in the
relationship between tribal and federal law: the federal government’s
simultaneous acknowledgment, and endorsement, of the trust responsibility
and the doctrine of tribal self-governance, and its competing caution with
regard to the expansion of tribal court criminal jurisdiction.
1. Indian Civil Rights Act
In his 1968 message to Congress on “Goals and Programs for the
American Indian” President Johnson “propose[d] a new goal for our Indian
programs: [a] goal that ends the old debate about ‘termination’ of Indian
programs and stresses self-determination; a goal that erases old attitudes of

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

434

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

paternalism and promotes partnership self-help.” 68 Generally recognized as
the outset of the self-determination era, this new direction of tribal policy
preceded the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 69 by just over a
month.
ICRA was enacted following a series of hearings held by the Senate
subcommittee on Constitutional Rights concerning the alleged deprivation
of civil liberties in Indian country. 70 Even though tribal feedback from the
ICRA hearings suggested that state and federal authorities were primarily
responsible for alleged mistreatment and civil liberties violations in Indian
country, 71 the bill’s primary sponsor, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC),
nevertheless framed the legislation as a remedy of what he saw as an
inability of tribes to administer justice on reservations, arguing that this was
the result of “tribal judges’ inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity
with the traditions and forms of the American legal system.” 72
During the drafting process, tribes expressed concerns that compliance
with ICRA would be financially unfeasible 73 and would run roughshod over
tribal culture and traditions. 74 Congress eventually removed the prohibition
on the establishment of religion from the draft ICRA legislation (though
maintaining the prohibition on interference with individual religious free
exercise); 75 dropped the requirement that tribes provide attorneys to
criminal defendants (though maintaining the defendant’s right to provide an
attorney at his or her own expense); and did not require that tribes provide a

68. Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: “The
Forgotten American,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 335 (Mar. 6, 1968).
69. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, § 201, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (1968) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).
70. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., pt. 3, at 769 (1962).
71. Such mistreatment took the form of physical abuses of Indians, the failure prosecute
crimes, refusal to fund tribal justice systems, and imposition of federal restrictions on the
operation of tribal courts. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 ‘Indian
Civil Rights’ Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 582-88 (1972).
72. 113 CONG. REC. 13,473 (1967) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
73. See generally Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights: Hearing on Title II on the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1969).
74. See generally Hearings on S. 961-968 and S.J. Res. 40 Before Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 243 (1965).
75. For a discussion of tribal constitutional treatment of religion, see generally Kristin
A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms Under Tribal Constitutional Law,
14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561 (2005).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss2/2

No. 2] TRIBAL JUSTICE IN THE SELF-DETERMINATION ERA

435

jury trial in civil cases. 76 As enacted, ICRA applies the majority of the U.S.
Constitution’s Bill of Rights to tribes and tribal courts; including, for
example, due process, equal protection, and freedom of speech, as well as
prohibitions on double jeopardy, takings, unreasonable search and seizure,
and cruel and unusual punishment. 77
By applying these Bill of Rights components on the exercise of tribal
authority under ICRA, Congress directly shaped the development and
application of tribal law by attaching conditions on its exercise.78 But ICRA
also played an important function in affirming the role of tribal courts. First,
by defining tribal “powers of self-government” as including “all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative,
and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which
they are executed,” 79 ICRA represents codified acknowledgment of tribal
judicial authority. Further, Congress recognized the importance of ensuring
that ICRA adjudications remained within the purview of the tribal courts
and provided a very limited remedies clause for alleged violations of ICRA
rights: “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe.” 80 Finally, the fact that Congress required tribal
courts to adopt multiple levels of federal protections for criminal defendants
likely helped ease staunch opponents of tribal court jurisdiction over
anyone, even Indians, into accepting the legitimacy of tribal court practice,
thus affording tribal courts an opportunity to establish themselves to
skeptics as functioning judiciaries in their own right.
In the immediate aftermath of ICRA, numerous federal courts accepted
appeals from parties arguing that their ICRA rights had been violated
during the course of the tribal adjudication.81 But in the seminal case of
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court invalidated this
76. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
77. Id. § 1302(a).
78. See, e.g., Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 317 n.21 (2000) (noting that
the application of ICRA “significantly infringe[s] on tribal self-government by injecting the
procedures and values of non-Indian legal thought into political systems that never
consented to such”).
79. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, § 201(2), 82 Stat. 73, 77 (1968) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
81. See, e.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969) (invalidating on due
process grounds tribal order removing individual from Navajo reservation for alleged
disrespect towards Tribal Council).
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practice, reasoning that the inclusion of the habeas clause in ICRA
represented congressional intent that habeas remain the sole non-tribal
remedy for alleged ICRA violations, and that federal courts therefore
lacked jurisdiction to substantively review non-habeas claims from tribal
courts. 82 As discussed infra, tribes have seized on this semi-exclusive
jurisdiction to further develop their own civil rights law even within the
confines of the federal system.
2. The Tribal Law and Order Act
Unlike the ICRA, which was intended primarily to protect the individual
rights of Indians and other persons subject to tribal jurisdiction, the tribal
court provisions of the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) 83 were intended
to expand tribal authority, albeit with important caveats. In fact, perhaps the
most notable provision of the TLOA was to roll back some of ICRA’s
restrictions on tribal criminal sentencing authority in order to help address
the high rates of crime in Indian communities, the similarly high rates of
prosecutorial declination by the Department of Justice, and the hampered
ability of tribal courts to themselves prosecute serious crimes on Indian
reservations under ICRA. 84
Section 234 of the Tribal Law and Order Act began by maximizing tribal
court prison sentencing authority to terms up to three years, as opposed to
the former one-year maximum. 85 It also explicitly authorized a common,
though controversial, tribal court practice of circumventing the previous
one-year sentencing limitation through “stacking” of multiple sentences,
though the TLOA caps the total penalty or punishment to a maximum term
of nine years in any criminal proceeding. 86 This expanded sentencing
authority only applies to criminal defendants who have been “previously
convicted of the same or a comparable offense by any jurisdiction in the
United States” or are “prosecuted for an offense comparable to an offense
that would be punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment if
prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.” 87
82. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (“In the absence here of any
unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe
under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit.”)
83. Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261 (2010).
84. Examining S. 797, the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1-3 (2009) (opening statement of Sen. Byron
L. Dorgan).
85. Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 234(a)(2), § 202(a)(7)(C), 124 Stat. 2258, 2280 (2010).
86. Id. § 202(a)(7)(D).
87. Id. § 202(b).
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In expanding tribal sentencing authority under the TLOA, Congress
simultaneously required additional rights for criminal defendants beyond
those imposed under ICRA. These protections are principally modeled on
federal constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants in American
courts; therefore, ensuring that tribal courts handing down longer criminal
sentences sufficiently mirror their state and federal counterparts in certain
ways. Specifically, prior to imposing a sentence of greater than one year for
any criminal defendant, the TLOA requires tribal courts to:
1. provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of
counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States
Constitution; and
2. at the expense of the tribal government, provide an indigent
defendant the assistance of a defense attorney licensed to
practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States that applies
appropriate professional licensing standards and effectively
ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its
licensing attorneys[.] 88
In addition to these requirements, any tribal court exercising expanded
sentencing authority under the TLOA must employ a judge to preside over
the criminal proceeding who “has sufficient legal training to preside over
criminal proceedings” and “is licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in
the United States[.]” 89 Further, the tribe must, “prior to charging the
defendant, make publicly available the criminal laws (including regulations
and interpretative documents), rules of evidence, and rules of criminal
procedure (including rules governing the recusal of judges in appropriate
circumstances) of the tribal government;” 90 and must “maintain a record of
the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other recording of the trial
proceeding.” 91
The TLOA stands as yet another example of federal Indian law’s
cautious view of unfettered tribal law, and the continued conditioning of
tribal law expansion on a further “federalization” of tribal courts. Although
the TLOA imposes these “Westernized” limitations on the exercise of tribal
court criminal jurisdiction, it also lends a great deal of power to tribal courts

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § 202(c).
Id. § 202(c)(3).
Id. § 202(c)(4).
Id. § 202(c)(5).
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through that explicit recognition,92 and at least two tribes have since passed
laws officially implementing TLOA sentencing authority. 93 For example,
by affirming the controversial practice of stacking sentences, 94 Congress
lent credence to a practice developed internally by tribal courts in order to
address significant hurdles facing tribal law enforcement efforts.95 This
recognition of internal tribal court development reemphasizes congressional
awareness and furtherance of tribal self-governance in and of itself, despite
potential misgivings towards federal Indian law’s increased presence on
tribal court criminal practice.
3. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
The passage of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2013 marked a major event in the modern recognition of tribal court
criminal jurisdiction.96 Though limited to certain listed crimes and to
defendants with certain ties to the tribe,97 section 904 of the VAWA
Reauthorization grants tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for the
first time since Oliphant. 98 Significantly, section 904 acknowledges tribal
92. At this point, though, that recognition exists more in theory than in practice; in May
of 2012, the Government Accountability Office reported that, primarily due to lack of
funding and confusion over funding availability, no tribes were yet exercising the TLOA
extended sentencing authority. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRIBAL LAW AND
ORDER ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING
AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY FOR
CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 8 (May 30, 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/
591213.pdf.
93. See Cherokee Council House Ordinance No. 182 (2012) (passed on Aug. 2, 2012),
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ordinance-182-2012.pdf; Anne
Minard, A Leader Emerges: Hopi Tribe Adopts New Criminal Code According to Tribal
Law and Order Act Standards, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 3, 2012)
(reporting that the Hopi Tribe passed a new criminal code implementing the TLOA on
August 28, 2012), available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/09/03/
leader-emerges-hopi-tribe-adopts-new-criminal-code-according-tribal-law-and-order-act.
94. Ramos v. Pyramid Tribal Court, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 621 F. Supp. 967 (D.
Nev. 1985) (holding that stacking convictions not violate the “cruel and unusual
punishment” provision of ICRA).
95. Christopher B. Chaney, Overcoming Legal Hurdles in the War Against Meth in
Indian Country, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2006) (citing stacking as an example of tribal
court practices designed to crack down on on-reservation methamphetamine abuse).
96. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54 (2013).
97. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. I 2013).
98. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, sec. 904, § 204, 127 Stat. at
120.
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criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders as an
inherent tribal power, rather than a delegated federal power, providing: “the
powers of self-government of a participating tribe include the inherent
power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”99
The VAWA reauthorization extends what the Act refers to as “special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction,” 100 which, as noted, is limited in
several important ways. First, the jurisdiction is limited to crimes of
domestic violence, dating violence, and certain violations of protection
orders. 101 Second, a tribe may not exercise jurisdiction if neither the victim
nor the alleged offender is an Indian. 102 Third, a tribe may only exercise
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant
who (1) resides within the Indian country of the tribe, (2) is employed
within the Indian country of the tribe, or (3) is the spouse, intimate partner,
or dating partner of a tribal member of other Indian residing within the
Indian country of the tribe. 103
Section 904 also imposes several requirements on tribal courts exercising
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction relating to protections for
criminal defendants. All rights protected under the Indian Civil Rights Act
apply to criminal defendants being prosecuted under section 904. 104
Further, all of the added protections that apply to criminal defendants
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or more under the TLOA
apply under section 904 in any case where a term of imprisonment of any
length may be imposed. 105 Section 904 also guarantees “the right to a trial
by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that — (A) reflect a fair
cross section of the community; and (B) do not systematically exclude any
distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians[.]” 106
Finally, section 904 requires tribes exercising special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction to provide criminal defendants with “all other rights
whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in
order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the
participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. § 204(a)(6).
Id. § 204(c).
Id. § 204(b)(4)(A).
Id. § 204(b)(4)(B).
Id. § 204(d)(1).
Id. § 204(d)(2).
Id. § 204(d)(3).
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jurisdiction over the defendant.” 107 The Department of Justice has
interpreted this last “constitutional catch-all” provision as one that “gives
courts the flexibility to expand the list of protected rights to include a
currently unforeseen right whose protection the 113th Congress did not
believe was essential to the exercise of [the expanded VAWA
jurisdiction]” 108 but that “does not require tribal courts to protect all federal
constitutional rights that federal courts are required to protect (for example,
the Fifth Amendment’s grand-jury indictment requirement, which state
courts are also not required to protect).” 109
While it remains to be seen how tribal courts will implement these
provisions as well as how they will be interpreted by federal courts, the
Department of Justice has commented:
Although the United States Constitution, which constrains the
federal and state governments, has never applied to Indian tribes
(which were not invited to, and did not attend, the 1787
Constitutional Convention), that fact does not leave the rights of
individual defendants in tribal courts unprotected. Both tribal
law and federal statutory law provide important protections for
criminal defendants’ rights. The tribal courts’ application of the
federal statutory rights described in subsection 1304(d) should
be comparable to state courts’ application of the corresponding
federal constitutional rights in similar cases.110
Interestingly, this statement is inconsistent with the manner in which at
least some federal courts have examined tribal court decisions under ICRA
and held that tribes need not “utilize judicial procedures identical to those
used in the United States Courts.” 111 Also, like the TLOA, the Justice
Department’s statement reminds tribes that the federal Indian law system is
simultaneously cautiously supportive of tribal court jurisdiction and yet
remains uncertain of its treatment of the rights of non-Indians.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. § 204(d)(4).
Pilot Project Notice, supra note 8, at 35,964.
Id.
Id. at 35,963.
Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997).
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B. Federal Funding of Tribal Legal Systems
Another way in which federal Indian law acts to both further the
development of tribal law and to impose conditions on its exercise is
through the allocation of resources (whether through grants or other
opportunities) to tribal justice systems. With the federal government acting
as the primary source of funding for many tribal governments and tribal
judiciaries, it therefore retains the power to set the conditions under which
tribal justice systems are funded. 112
The issue of funding is an extremely practical one, with direct
consequences for the day-to-day ability of tribal justice systems to function
effectively and to engage in the work of developing and applying tribal law.
The Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993 (ITJA) was passed in recognition of
this very fact. 113 In enacting the ITJA, Congress acknowledged that the
federal trust responsibility supports the exercise of sovereignty by tribal
governments, and that “tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and
safety and the political integrity of tribal governments[.]” 114 It further
declared that “traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the
maintenance of the culture and identity of Indian tribes and to the goals of
this Act” 115 and that “tribal justice systems are inadequately funded, and the
lack of adequate funding impairs their operation[.]”116
Section 101 of the ITJA established the Office of Tribal Justice Support
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, whose functions include “[p]rovid[ing]
funds to Indian tribes and tribal organizations for the development,
enhancement, and continuing operation of tribal justice systems” and for
the “continuation and enhancement of traditional tribal judicial
practices.” 117 The ITJA authorized appropriations of $7,000,000 per year
for seven years for the Office of Tribal Justice Support to carry out section
101 and to conduct a survey of tribal justice systems; $50,000,000 per year

112. Hearing on H.R. 1268, supra note 10, at 76 (testimony of Robert Yazzie, Chief
Justice for the Navajo Nation) (“Control of the purse strings includes control as to how the
money is spent.”).
113. See Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(2012)).
114. Id. § 2(5), 107 Stat. at 2004.
115. Id. § 2(7), 107 Stat. at 2004.
116. Id. § 2(8), 107 Stat. at 2004.
117. Id. § 101(c)(1), (6), 107 Stat. at 2005-06 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(1), (6)
(2012)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

442

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

for base support funding for tribal justice systems pursuant to the ISDEAA;
and $500,000 per year for tribal judicial conferences. 118
The ITJA was passed following extensive testimony about the dire need
for increased funding for tribal justice systems. 119 But in congressional
testimony leading up to the passage of the ITJA, tribes were both adamant
about the immediate need for funding and equally concerned about how
such assistance would be administered. 120 Specifically, tribal leaders and
justice officials insisted throughout that the receipt of funding must not be
accompanied by conditions that would threaten the integrity or constrain the
flexibility of tribal justice systems. 121 They were also clear that the concept
of “tribal justice systems” under an Act designed to fund and support those
systems must be broad enough to recognize and include whatever system
the tribes deemed most appropriate for themselves, including traditional
systems that might be fundamentally different from the American state and
federal court model. 122
As a threshold matter, tribal witnesses were concerned about the
definition of “tribal justice systems” that would be adopted in the ITJA. The
Chairman of the Shoshone Business Council testified before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, stating:
118. Id. § 201, 107 Stat. at 2009 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3621).
119. See generally Hearing on H.R. 1268, supra note 10; accord id. at 70 (written
testimony of President Leonard Atole and Chief Tribal Judge Carey Vicenti, Jicarilla
Apache Tribe) (“[T]he lack of federal funding and resources remains the biggest obstacle
facing tribes as they develop effective tribal justice systems. . . . Because of the scarcity of
tribal resources and other pressing governmental and social services needs, the tribal court
budget has not seen a real increase for five consecutive years. The $250,000 the tribe
annually allocates to its trial court is money it can’t use to solve the rampant unemployment
and other needs on the Reservation. Although training is mandated by tribal policy there are
insufficient funds to provide that training. The trial court is in dire need of additional staff, a
public defender, a full-time prosecutor, law books and a space to house the books, additional
court and office space, updated equipment and monies to repair, expand and modernize the
court and juvenile and adult detention facilities. Too often important court proceedings are
interrupted by the emergency of fixing a busted pipe.”); see also Hearing Before the Comm.
on Indian Affairs on S. 521, to Assist the Development of Tribal Judicial Systems, 103d
Cong. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 521].
120. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 97 (statement of Elbridge Coochise,
President, Nat’l Am. Indian Court Judges Ass’n) (“The bill should clarify that Federal
funding should be made to Tribal governments for Tribal Courts in a manner that minimizes
Federal and administrative costs and that encourages flexibility and innovation by Tribal
justice systems. This funding must avoid encroaching on Tribal traditions, and should
protect the diversity of Tribal Court systems.”).
121. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
122. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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First, it is very important that the definition of ‘tribal justice
system’ remain broad enough to cover the types of dispute
resolution practiced in traditional tribal governments. Our
Tribes are traditional governments, having no constitutions and
governed by General Councils, which consist of the entire adult
memberships of the two Tribes. When they meet, our General
Councils are the Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court
all rolled into one. Our tribal business councils and our tribal
court exercise only those powers expressly delegated to them by
the General Councils.
The General Councils now are
considering the establishment of Peacemakers, tribal elders
authorized to resolve minor civil disputes without all the
formality of litigation. 123
The Shoshone Business Council supported a version of the legislation that
would permit the Tribe to use federal funding for such systems under a
broad definition of “tribal justice system,” 124 and several other tribes
offered similar testimony. 125 As ultimately passed, the ITJA defined “tribal
justice systems” as “the entire judicial branch, and employees thereof, of an
Indian tribe, including (but not limited to) traditional methods and forums
for dispute resolution, lower courts, appellate courts (including intertribal
appellate courts), alternative dispute resolution systems, and circuit rider
systems, established by inherent tribal authority whether or not they
123. Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 56 (testimony of Darwin St. Clair, Sr.,
Chairman, Shoshone Business Council).
124. Id.
125. For example, the Pueblo of Tesuque submitted a similar statement:
The Pueblo has a number of specific comments regarding S. 521. One of the
key elements of the bill is its recognition of traditional forums of dispute
resolution. The right to tribal self-government includes the right to determine
the form of government, including the form and nature of the tribal justice
system. The definition of ‘tribal justice system’ in S. 521 is, we believe broad
enough to cover the types of dispute resolution practiced in traditional tribal
governments like Tesuque’s. Most tribes do not choose to have full separation
of powers — judicial, legislative, and executive — and, thus, many tribes do
not have distinct judicial branches. At the Pueblo of Tesuque, we have both a
formal tribal court as well as a traditional forum for dispute resolution. Both
systems work hand-in-hand and are integral to our way of life in the ‘90s. Both
systems are unique and have their own needs for resources. We are pleased
that S. 521 is sufficiently broad to require BIA to provide assistance to all the
numerous forms of tribal justice systems.
Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 58-59 (testimony of Charles Dorame, Governor, on
behalf of the Pueblo of Tesuque).
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constitute a court of record.” 126 By authorizing funding for this wide array
of tribal dispute resolution mechanisms, Congress rightfully acknowledged
that tribal adjudicative systems might not always be the type of tribal courts
envisioned under ICRA.
Tribes were also concerned about the level of control that the BIA would
have through the Office of Tribal Justice Support over tribal justice
systems, both directly and more indirectly, and requested language to
“[make] it clear that the Bureau does not authorize the Office of Tribal
Justice Support to impose justice standards on Indian tribes.” 127 As
expressed in a letter submitted for the record by the Zuni Pueblo,
[W]e wish to make it clear that while we support the
establishment of an Office of Tribal Justice Support within the
Bureau of Indian Affairs as a means of further funding certain
training and technical assistance to tribes, we also support the
continuation of traditional tribal judicial practices. In particular,
we urge [Congress] to allow tribes which wish to do so to
continue their practices of handling land matters at the tribal
council level where such issues as land division in the case of
death on an elder can be resolved according to time-honored
traditions. 128

126. Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-176, § 3(8), 107 Stat. 2004, 2005
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3602).
127. Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 26 (testimony of Darwin St. Clair, Sr.,
Chairman, Shoshone Business Council) (“It is important that the office should be explicitly
prevented from overruling tribes’ decisions of this nature. We have been looking at ways of
fairly resolving disputes other than using the system used by non-Indians.”); see also id. at
58 (testimony of Charles Dorame, Governor, on behalf of the Pueblo of Tesuque)
(supporting similar language) (“It is important that the Office of Tribal Justice not be given
authority to override tribal self-government to determine the nature and form of tribal justice
systems.”); id. at 66 (testimony of Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice for the Navajo Nation) (“Our
major concern is that the BIA will impose court standards on our tribal system at a time
when we are developing our own innovative and traditional approaches.”); id. at 153 (Letter
from the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs) (“The ‘Office’ (B.I.A. & Solicitor Office) must not be allowed
to construe or devise criteria that in any way impair the ability of the Tribal Court to operate
in the manner enacted by the Tribal Government. No ‘B.I.A.M.’ that influences the Tribe to
alter its judicial system, do [sic] to imposed funding criteria.”); see also Hearing on H.R.
1268, supra note 10, at 54 (similar testimony provided).
128. Hearing on H.R. 1268, supra note 10, at 120 (Letter from the Pueblo of Zuni to the
Honorable Bill Richardson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Native American Affairs.).
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The tribes were concerned not only with direct attempts by the BIA to
control the administration of justice by tribes, but also by the potential and
perhaps even unintended “homogenizing” effect of appointing a single
office to assist hundreds of different tribes in the implementation of their
justice systems. 129 They had similar concerns about whether or not formulas
used to determine funding would adequately account for the uniqueness of
tribal dispute resolution practices. The Pueblo of Laguna wrote to the
committee:
The Pueblo opposes the development of caseload standards for
tribal courts, either as a means of determining funding or
evaluating tribal court performance. Neither Congress, the BIA,
nor any outside entity should determine the structure of tribal
justice systems.
The imposition of caseload standards
determines, in many aspects, the structure of the tribal justice
system. 130
The Pueblo explained,
When the Office begins dictating how many cases must be
handled by tribal staff in order to receive funding, it is in effect
dictating the manner in which justice is to be dispensed. Some
tribal justice systems incorporate traditional forms of dispute
resolution which can be quite labor intensive; many of these
‘alternative dispute resolutions’ forums do not, because of their
nature, result in formal case filings or the public dissemination of
the existence of a dispute.131
The Pueblo was joined by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, expressing a similar
concern:

129. Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 129 (Letter from the Jicarilla Apache Tribe to
Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, and Senator John McCain, Vice Chairman, Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs) (“[T]he Jicarilla Apache Tribe is cognizant of the
homogenizing affect [sic] BIA may have in proposing boilerplate codes and court
administrative procedures. We recall the use of boilerplate constitutions following passage
of the Indian Reorganization Act. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe has had to review and reform
that model constitution five times since its adoption because the form Constitution simply
could not and did not reflect the Tribe’s own history, traditions and decisions on how to
structure its government and laws.”).
130. Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 145 (Letter from Harry D. Early, Governor,
Pueblo of Laguna, to Senator Daniel K. Inouye and Senator John McCain).
131. Id. at 143.
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Our trial court is increasingly using what is now known as
‘alternative dispute resolution’ mechanisms and traditional
methods for resolving disputes before a case is actually filed.
These ADR and traditional mechanisms are often more labor
intensive than standard court filings. However, they usually
produce better results. Caseload standards simply will not
reflect these distinct methods of resolving disputes and tribes
should not be penalized in the funding formula for being
innovative or using traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. 132
This testimony pinpoints subtle, but very real, forces at play in the
interaction between federal Indian law and policy and the implementation
of tribal law, as well as the practical influence that federal laws can have
over the exercise of tribal law through recognition and allocation of
resources. It also represents tribal recognition of the interrelationship
between federal law and tribal law, and a concentrated tribal effort to
protect the latter in expansions of the former. In the case of the ITJA, tribes
succeeded in securing language to reduce more direct interference with the
operation of tribal justice systems under tribal standards, as Congress
provided in the ITJA that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed or
construed to authorize the Office to impose justice standards on Indian
tribes,” 133 in addition to various disclaimers. 134 The Office may still
exercise a more subtle influence, though, through the provision of technical

132. Id. at 130 (Letter from the Jicarilla Apache Tribe to Senator Daniel K. Inouye,
Chairman, and Senator John McCain, Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 3611(d) (2012).
134. 25 U.S.C § 3665 (2012). The statute provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to — (1) encroach upon or diminish
in any way the inherent sovereign authority of each tribal government to
determine the role of the tribal justice system within the tribal government or to
enact and enforce tribal laws; (2) diminish in any way the authority of tribal
governments to appoint personnel;(3) impair the rights of each tribal
government to determine the nature of its own legal system or the appointment
of authority within the tribal government; (4) alter in any way any tribal
traditional dispute resolution forum; (5) imply that any tribal justice system is
an instrumentality of the United States; or (6) diminish the trust responsibility
of the United States to Indian tribal governments and tribal justice systems of
such governments.
Id.
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assistance 135 and the determination of how to apportion funding between
the tribes, 136 leading perhaps (consciously or not) to a federal preference for
a certain style of tribal court systems.
Grants and other opportunities may also be created as part of the kind of
jurisdictional legislation discussed supra. Both the TLOA and the VAWA
authorize funding for grant programs or extend eligibility for existing
funding programs to tribes. 137 In such contexts, federal funding for tribal
justice systems may be seen as more directly tied to conditions explicitly
meant to bring those justice systems into closer alignment with the
American state and federal model. That is not to say that tribes reject such
funding opportunities — indeed, once conditions are imposed in exchange
for expanded recognition of tribal jurisdiction, it is important for tribes to
have access to the resources necessary to meet those conditions in order to
receive the benefit of expanded recognition. Moreover, at least some tribes
may want to extend the types of protections that those conditions impose,
but lack the funding to do so. For example, some tribal witnesses at the
ITJA hearings requested that Congress include language in the ITJA
requiring tribal justice systems to provide a right to counsel as defined by
135. The ITJA also directs the Office to provide technical assistance and training and to
“[p]romote cooperation and coordination among tribal justice systems and the Federal and
State judiciary systems.” 25 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(2)-(4).
136. We note that none of the funding authorized under the ITJA has ever actually been
appropriated. See Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs Hearing the President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget for Tribal
Programs 10 (Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/hearings/loader.cfm
?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=13321. That testimony also noted:
Further, the method by which BIA supplemental court funding is distributed is
seriously flawed and needs to be overhauled. Currently, in order to obtain
necessary additional operating funds, a tribal court must undergo — and fail —
a court evaluation. This deters tribes from seeking additional funding because
they must be assessed as being sub-standard; and this information becomes
public, undermining the reputation and credibility of the tribal court. In
addition, the innovative tribal courts that achieve success with pilot programs
are unable to obtain funding to continue the programs or to allow for
replication as best practices by other tribal nations. A confidential evaluation
process and award system that allow for under-functioning courts to receive
additional funding and also support successful pilot programs should be
developed and implemented.
Id.
137. Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 243, § 1701, 124 Stat. 2258,
2292-94 (2010) (Tribal Resources Grant Program); Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, § 204(f), 127 Stat. 54, 120.
(Grants to Tribal Governments).
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tribal law, 138 testifying that they desired to provide the right to counsel to
criminal defendants in their courts, but simply did not have funding. These
tribes were willing, and even preferred, to require the protection of this
right in tribal courts through federal law, as long as that was accomplished
through a vehicle that would also provide the resources. This stands as an
important reminder that the federal push towards a United States
constitutional model is not necessarily inherently unwelcome among tribes,
and may in fact be viewed instead simply as a best practice or a codification
of a comparable tribal tradition. Critically, though, these tribal witnesses
requested that the right to counsel be defined by tribal law, rather than
federal or state law.139
The TLOA and the VAWA also both require tribes to guarantee effective
assistance of counsel, with no stipulation that the right be defined under
tribal law. Under the TLOA, tribal courts must “provide to the defendant
the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed
by the United States Constitution” in order to exercise the expanded
sentencing authority permitted under the Act.140 VAWA further extends all
protections that apply under the TLOA, including the right to counsel, to
defendants subject to a tribe’s exercise of special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction under the VAWA. 141 As noted, the Department of
Justice has opined that “[t]he tribal courts’ application of the federal
statutory rights described in [the VAWA] should be comparable to state
courts’ applications of the corresponding federal constitutional rights in
similar cases.” 142
Thus, funding to implement the right to counsel requirement under the
TLOA and VAWA may not be available to tribal justice systems in which
the right to counsel looks too different from what it would look like under
state or federal law. This likely restricts funding to those tribes with courts
that appear similar to their state and federal counterparts. Of course, this
138. Hearing on S. 521, supra note 117, at 1 (testimony of Elbridge Coochise, Chief
Judge, Northwest Intertribal Court System) (“The legislation should include a provision
stipulating a right to counsel. Many of our tribes have not provided for defense counsel for
our members, solely because we don’t have funds to do so. In that stipulation it would be
defined by tribal law who is to represent them in court.”); id. at 50 (testimony of W. Ron
Allen, Chairman, Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe) (“The legislation should include a provision
stipulating a right to counsel as defined by Tribal law”).
139. Id.
140. Tribal Law and Order Act, sec. 234, § 1302(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2280.
141. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, sec. 904, § 204(d)(2), 127
Stat. at 120.
142. Pilot Project Notice, supra note 8, at 35,963.
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approach can lead to uniformity across jurisdictions, making it more likely
that a non-tribal forum will extend comity to tribal courts, and will
generally acclimate skeptics towards tribal court practices and encourage
future expansion of tribal court jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it does not
change the fact that on some level, it may discourage truly unique tribal
practices.
C. Comity Towards Tribal Courts
In light of the practical need for outside recognition of tribal court
authority, 143 the influence that federal courts (and, for the purposes of this
discussion, state courts) wield as a condition of that recognition act as an
additional facet of the relationship between federal Indian law and tribal
law. Because the federal government, states, and Indian tribes coexist as
separate sovereigns, “they have no direct power to enforce their judgments
in each other’s [courts].” 144 As a result, in order for a state or federal court
to enforce a tribal court judgment, the tribal court must be afforded
comity, 145 thus exerting strong pressure on tribal justice systems to apply
tribal law in a manner compatible with state and federal jurisprudence. As
Roman J. Duran, Vice President of the National American Indian Court
Judges Association, testified before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
in 2008: “[n]ow more than any time in their history, tribes and their tribal
courts are challenged to maintain their judicial and tribal sovereignty in a
manner that will pass legal scrutiny by the federal judicial system.” 146

143. Tribes themselves often lack the means to enforce tribal court judgments,
particularly in civil cases involving non-Indians. See, e.g., Craig Smith, Comment, Full
Faith and Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Tribal Court Decisions Revisited, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1393, 1405-06 (2010) (discussing evidence of low enforcement rates of tribal judgments in
non-tribal forums).
144. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
145. While tribal courts are occasionally extended full faith and credit, rather than
comity, courts analyzing tribal court judgments based on a comity analysis are far more
revealing as to prevailing views of tribal court legitimacy in the eyes of non-tribal
judiciaries, and the comparative federal Indian law pressure on tribal courts to conform tribal
law to a “constitutionally acceptable” standard. See, e.g., Robert Laurence, The Enforcement
of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589, 651-62 (1990) (examining the historical
progression of the debate).
146. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs: Tribal Courts and the
Administration of Justice in Indian Country, 110th Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon.
Roman J. Duran, First Vice President, Nat’l Am. Indian Court Judges Ass’n).
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The doctrine of comity has its origins in federal common law stemming
from the Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot, 147 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial
upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why
the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits
of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon
the judgment, be tried afresh[.] 148
In implementing this general doctrine in the tribal court context, many
courts have adopted the analysis established in Wilson v. Marchington and
its progeny and apply the following rules towards tribal court comity:
1. Federal courts may neither recognize nor enforce tribal judgments
if:
a. the tribal court did not have both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction; or
b. the defendant was not afforded due process of law.
2. A federal court may, in its discretion, decline to recognize and
enforce a tribal judgment on equitable grounds, including the
following circumstances:
a. the judgment was obtained by fraud;
b. the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is
entitled to recognition;
c. the judgment is inconsistent with the parties’ contractual
choice of forum; or

147. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
148. Id. at 202-03.
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d. recognition of the judgment, or the cause of action upon
which it is based, is against the public policy of the United
States or the forum state in which recognition of the
judgment is sought. 149
Perhaps the comity cases most telling for our purposes are those that
examine whether the tribal court provided a defendant with due process of
law. “Due process, as that term is employed in comity [analysis,] . . .
[requires that there be] opportunity for a full and fair trial before an
impartial tribunal that conducts the trial upon regular proceedings after
proper service or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and that there is no
showing of prejudice in the tribal court or in the system of governing
laws.” 150 These cases are emblematic of the intersection between federal
Indian law and tribal law, and the former’s tendency to shape the latter.
Several courts have adopted a general rule that tribal court proceedings
that comply with ICRA are inherently compatible with due process,151 even
when, for example, that compliance with ICRA resulted in the defendant
being criminally tried without being afforded the right to counsel. 152 Other
courts have been more skeptical of tribal court proceedings. For example, in
United States v. Cavanaugh, 153 the court refused to consider the defendant’s
tribal court domestic violence convictions as prior convictions under a
federal statute making it a crime to commit a domestic assault within Indian
country if the defendant had at least two prior final convictions for similar
assault. 154 The court reasoned that the lack of counsel provided to the
defendant in tribal court, although fully compliant with ICRA, nevertheless
violated due process. 155 Although the district court’s opinion in Cavanaugh
was ultimately overturned, 156 its reasoning underscores the inherent
149. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810; accord MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057 (10th
Cir. 2007) (generally applying the Wilson doctrine).
150. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Unless
a tribal conviction has been vacated through habeas proceedings or on other grounds, it
constitutes a valid conviction . . . [and] does not violate a defendant’s right to due process in
a federal prosecution.”)
152. Id. at 999; accord State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Mont. 2003).
153. 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D.N.D. 2009).
154. Id. at 1074-77.
155. Id.
156. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter
alia, Spotted Eagle, and approving of its reasoning concerning the necessity of affording
comity to tribal court convictions that were set out in accordance with ICRA); see also
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999 n.6 (rejecting the district court’s decision in Cavanaugh).
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tensions between federal Indian law and tribal law, as some judges do not
even view ICRA compliance as setting a high enough bar for the
recognition of tribal court judgments.
This general suspicion towards tribal court practice, while perhaps
exaggerated in Cavanaugh and similar cases, nevertheless permeates
comity analysis. The nominal baseline principle among state and federal
courts is that, absent one of the Wilson exceptions, “[t]he importance of
tribal courts and the dignity we accord their decisions will weigh in favor of
comity in any case where we have discretion to recognize and enforce a
tribal court judgment.” 157 But the relevant and discretionary due process,
equity, and public policy determinations are made pursuant to the values
and norms of the state or federal forum in which enforcement is sought, and
not pursuant to the values of the tribe. 158 Some courts recognize and seek to
counter federal encroachment, holding they must “refuse to accept
jurisdiction over a case when doing so ‘would undermine the authority of
the tribal courts,’” 159 or stating that comity “does not require that a tribe
utilize judicial procedures identical to those used in the United States
Courts.” 160 But as the cases illustrate, many non-Indian forums nevertheless
engage in non-tribal determinations of due process and equity despite their
alleged deference to tribal law.
For example, if the case involves the interpretation of tribal laws or
customs that “differ significantly from those commonly employed in
Anglo-Saxon society,” 161 tribes are afforded more leeway, as courts will
“weigh the individual right to fair treatment against the magnitude of the
tribal interest in employing those procedures to determine whether the
procedures pass muster.” 162 By comparison, and despite the congressional
directive that tribal courts be able to develop their own robust legal
157. Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001).
158. Cf. Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 57-58 (Alaska 2008) (refusing to enforce tribal
ICWA judgment when tribal court did not provide a relevant party with adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard, which the Court found “are essential elements of due process under
the Alaska Constitution”), and Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088, 1094
(N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a tribal court judgment of punitive damages rendered
against a non-Indian, holding that the award was “perfectly consistent with New Mexico
public policy”).
159. Beltran v. Harrah’s Ariz. Corp., 202 P.3d 494, 501 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959)).
160. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997).
161. Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
162. Id.
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systems, 163 courts will apply “federal constitutional standards . . . in
determining whether the challenged procedure violates the [Indian Civil
Rights] Act,” 164 reasoning that “concerns for respecting a sovereign’s
procedures and avoiding paternalism are reduced when tribal court laws and
procedures governing trials and appeals track those of our federal
courts.” 165 Courts have used this general reasoning to decline extensions of
comity, or full faith and credit under similar analysis, to tribal courts for
reasons such as failure to provide adequate notice to interested parties in
child custody hearings, 166 failure to timely rule on a defendant’s in forma
pauperis motion, 167 failure to prohibit a party from discussing race in a
closing argument against a non-Indian defendant, 168 failure to provide
parties with counsel at a child custody hearing, 169 failure to timely rule on
evidentiary hearings, 170 confusion and lack of coordination between
different judges on the same case, 171 and concerns over separation of
powers between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.172
In contrast to this heightened scrutiny applied to tribal courts, federal
courts routinely extend comity to foreign judiciaries that fail to apply
American standards of due process so long as there are no “outrageous
departures from our own motions of civilized jurisprudence” 173 and the
judgment is “‘fundamentally fair’ and do[es] not offend against ‘basic
fairness.’” 174 Courts will also afford particular deference to “favored

163. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66-70 (1978) (detailing legislative
history of the ICRA and emphasizing importance of avoiding undue intrusion into tribal
jurisprudence); see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987) (“Tribal
courts play a vital role in tribal self-government, and the Federal Government has
consistently encouraged their development.”) (internal citation omitted).
164. Randall, 841 F.2d at 900.
165. Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001).
166. See, e.g., Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 56-59 (Alaska 2008); In re DeFender, 435
N.W.2d 717, 721 n.4 (S.D. 1989); Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
167. Randall, 841 F.2d at 900-02.
168. Bird, 255 F.3d at 1149-52.
169. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d at 144.
170. Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1173 (10th Cir. 2006).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1170.
173. British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.
1974); accord De Csepel v. Republic of Hung., 714 F.3d 591, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
174. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
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systems,” 175 such as the courts of England that are “likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country
and those of other countries.” 176 Thus, federal courts have upheld
convictions based on statements made to foreign law enforcement without
Miranda warnings; 177 the use of evidence obtained through searches and
seizures that would have violated the Fourth Amendment had they been
conducted in the United States; 178 the introduction into evidence of prior
convictions rendered by courts sitting without juries, 179 or trials that would
have violated double jeopardy. 180 These cases routinely turn on the court’s
finding that these constitutional shortcomings were acceptable absent a
showing that the “[foreign] legal system lacks the procedural protections
necessary for fundamental fairness.” 181 Yet, courts rarely delve into the
same “fundamental fairness” examination when it comes to tribal courts;
rather, they simply create per se rules that if tribal courts do not provide
certain rights, comity will not be extended. 182
It would be more consistent with the general rule of comity for state and
federal courts to acknowledge tribal judgments, as they do in the foreign
context, absent a grievous breach of due process. But the tribal-specific
comity doctrine, although nominally developed from the basis of foreign
comity, nevertheless reflects the dichotomous relationship between federal
and tribal law. While federal law acknowledges that tribal courts are due
deference and should be encouraged to draft and apply tribal law, there is a
simultaneous undercurrent that tribal courts are comparatively
untrustworthy when applying “federal” law.

175. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citation
omitted).
176. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff’d, 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (citation
omitted).
177. See United States v. Covington, 783 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Conway, No. 93-8124, 1995 WL 339403 (10th Cir. June 8, 1995); State v.
Burke, 717 P.2d 1039 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
178. United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Hawkins,
661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
179. United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 1998); United States v. Wilson, 556
F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1977).
180. United States v. Brito-Hernandez, 996 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1993).
181. United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977).
182. See, e.g., Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 56-57 (Alaska 2008) (no comity for tribal
court cases that fail to give notice in child proceedings, regardless of context).
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This is not to say that tribal courts do not make mistakes of law, or that
tribes and tribal judges always treat parties fairly. Indeed, critics argue that
ICRA’s constitutional limitations and the “consent theory” weigh against
any expansion of tribal court jurisdiction,183 and even ardent supporters of
tribal rights have argued that tribes should, for example, waive sovereign
immunity for ICRA claims as a matter of good governance.184 Additionally,
there are certainly policy arguments to be made that state and federal court
oversight of tribal courts, whether through ICRA, comity analysis, or
otherwise, helps provide accountability to tribal courts and encourages best
practices. But it is undeniable that the development of federal Indian law in
this area has presented unique difficulties for tribal courts seeking to apply
tribal law, as tribes must strive to balance cultural traditions and community
needs with the reality that the more “alien” or “tribal” the judgment, the less
likely it is that it will ever be upheld or enforced at the state or federal
level — even if those judgments are fundamentally fair in any context.
IV. Tribal Courts and Tribal Law: Navigating the Federal Indian Law
System
Though Indian tribes have long exercised inherent authority to address
crime and conflict within their societies, navigating the practical
consequences of existing as a “sovereign within a sovereign” has brought
new challenges to the exercise of these powers. The relationship between
federal Indian law and tribal law is magnified as tribes seek to implement
their justice systems in the manner most responsive to their unique needs
and circumstances. Tribal justice systems adhere to, build on, depart from,
and continue to experiment with what might be called “traditional” justice
practices as relevant to each particular tribe, whether through wholly unique
applications of customary law or tribal court interpretation of ICRA.
Rather than conduct an exhaustive survey of what tribal criminal law is
or could be, this section examines the tribal law side of the equation
through consideration of a particularly well-developed and widely
recognized tribal justice system: that of the Navajo Nation. Because the
Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation is a well-known and often-cited
example of a robust, well-functioning and distinctly tribal justice system,
183. See, e.g., Gede, supra note 6, at 40 (“[T]here are still significant reasons to be
concerned that [the tribal provision of the 2013 VAWA reauthorization] may raise difficult
constitutional issues and serious policy objections.”).
184. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1108-16
(2007).
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the Navajo Nation Peacemaking Program is a convenient example and a
good starting point for discussion that aims to consider the full potential of
tribal law. 185
A. The Navajo Peacemaking Program
The Peacemaking Program exists alongside the Navajo Nation’s family
courts, district courts, and the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. 186 Initially
given the name Navajo Peacemaker Court, the program institutionalizes the
longstanding Navajo practice of peacemaking and was created in 1982 by
the Navajo Judicial Conference.187 Its purpose was “to find an alternative to
Anglo-American judicial methods that had roots in Navajo common law,
and which could pull in Diné wisdom, methods and customs in resolving
disputes.” 188 Currently, the Peacemaking Program is available as an
alternative to the Navajo courts, though matters requiring court orders, such
as divorces or applications for restraining orders and domestic violence
matters are among certain matters which must first be filed in tribal
court. 189 Then, these matters are referred by the court to the Peacemaking
Program upon request of the parties.190
The Navajo Peacemaking process uses what Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice
of the Navajo Nation from 1992 to 2003, refers to in English 191 as the

185. The Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation itself provides quite a bit of information
on its website, see The Peacemaking Program of the Navajo Nation, NAVAJOCOURTS.ORG,
http://www.navajocourts.org/indexpeacemaking.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014), and
numerous and detailed scholarly studies have been published, cf. RAYMOND D. AUSTIN,
NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
(2009); MARIANNE O. NIELSEN & JAMES W. ZION, NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE (2005); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It”: Navajo Justice
Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175 (1994).
186. Courts & Peacemaking in the Navajo Nation, NAVAJOCOURTS.ORG, http://www.
navajocourts.org/publicguide.htm (last updated May 16, 2013).
187. PEACEMAKING PROGRAM OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION: PLAN OF
OPERATIONS (July 30, 2012), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/Peacemaking/Plan/
PPPO2013-2-25.pdf [hereinafter PLAN OF OPERATIONS].
188. See id. at 2.
189. See id. at 37.
190. Id.
191. Navajo Peacemaking (and Navajo law generally) involves many Navajo concepts
that are not easily translated into English. See, e.g. Justice Raymond D. Austin, American
Indian Customary Law in the Modern Courts of American Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV.
351, 368 (2011).
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“talking out” process. 192 The process is based on Navajo Fundamental Law
and aims to achieve consensus between the parties — those commonly
referred to in American state and federal (and many tribal) courts as the
offender and the victim. 193 The participation of family members of both the
offender and the victim is also a key aspect of Navajo Peacemaking.
Indeed, the Navajo Peacemaking response to criminal behavior is rooted in
Navajo cultural notions of relationships and the nature of crime and
dispute. 194 As explained by Chief Justice Yazzie,
What is an offender? It is someone who shows little regard for
right relationships. That person has little respect for others.
Navajos say of such a person, ‘He acts as if he has no relatives.’
So, what do you do when someone acts as if they have no
relatives? You bring in the relatives! Victim rights are an
important issue. What do you do about them? There, too, you
bring in the relatives. 195
Other individuals involved in or affected by the crime that has been
committed may also participate or attend.196
Procedurally, Chief Justice Yazzie describes Navajo Peacemaking as
consisting of six elements: “(1) prayer, (2) expressing feelings, (3) ‘the
lecture’, (4) discussion, (5) reconciliation, and (6) consensus.” 197 After the
prayer, which Chief Justice Yazzie says “puts people in the right frame of
mind” for the process, all those involved in the conflict are given an
opportunity to express their view and their feelings about what happened. 198
Here, Chief Justice Yazzie points out one of the major differences between
the peacemaking system and the adversarial process utilized in the
American federal system:
192. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie, Healing as Justice: The Navajo Response to Crime, in
JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS 121, 130 (Wanda D. McCaslin ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Yazzie, Response to Crime].
193. See, e.g., PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 12-13.
194. Relationships (especially family and clan relationships) form a major part of the
legal structure in Navajo society. See Yazzie, Response to Crime, supra note 187, at 122-23.
195. Id. at 123.
196. See PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 6 (describing the four categories of
participants in peacemaking).
197. Yazzie, Response to Crime, supra note 187, at 125; see also Donna Coker,
Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons From Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 99 n.500 (1999) (describing the author’s experience with the lecture and prayer
process).
198. Yazzie, Response to Crime, supra note 187, at 125.
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Opinion evidence is freely allowed within the bounds of saying
things in a respectful way. . . . In Western courtrooms, a person
is not allowed to express how he or she feels. Yet expressing
emotions is an essential part of healing. . . . That is part of
making or restoring a healthy relationship. 199
During the “lecture” portion of the Peacemaking process, it is the
Peacemaker’s job to offer insight and guidance by framing the dispute with
reference to Navajo law and knowledge: “[t]he peacemaker will relate parts
of the Hajine Bahane, our creation lore, and apply it to the problem. The
old ‘stories’ are actually a form of precedent that everyone respects.” 200
Unlike a neutral mediator, or even a judge whose role could be described as
simply applying law to the facts, peacemakers may also offer their own
opinions during the lecture. 201 After the peacemaker has guided the
participants, all participants in the peacemaking are permitted to engage in
discussion. Again, family participation is key, as powerfully illustrated in
examples recounted by Chief Justice Yazzie:
Having relatives participate in the process is fundamental.
Consider the following example: A young Navajo woman took a
man to court in a paternity action for child support. The man
denied that he was the father. It was his word against hers, and
most Navajos can’t afford blood tests. The judge sent the case to
the peacemaker court. The couple’s parents attended. The
discussion was no longer about whether the man was the father,
but what the families were going to do for the well-being of their
child. … Family participation is part of the healing process
because it gets past denial. Denial — the psychological barrier
that underlies most cases of child abuse, alcohol-related crime,
family violence, sexual abuse, and driving while intoxicated —
is the act of people refusing to face reality or own up to their
actions. 202

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 126.
Id.; accord PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 10.
Yazzie, Response to Crime, supra note 187, at 126.
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Chief Justice Yazzie also notes that the discussion aspect of the Navajo
Peacemaking process is effective as a means of identifying the root cause of
a crime, so that cause can be meaningfully addressed.203
When the Navajo Peacemaking Court was first initiated, it was not used
in cases involving violence and threats against personal safety. Instead,
such cases were confined to the Navajo Nation courts which, like American
state and federal courts, “focus[ed] on safety issues first and foremost in
legal interventions, [and] cautiously advocated coerced separation.” 204 The
Navajo Nation has since revisited the assumptions underlying that
approach. As the current Plan of Operations for the Peacemaking Program
notes, “[t]he presumption is that separation increases safety. However, it is
clear that coerced separation may sometimes result in greater violence,
especially when there is no police presence to enforce the separation. The
issuance of a restraining order, without involvement and investment of a
rural and isolated community, and without police presence, may escalate
violence.” 205 On the other hand, “Peacemaking, in essence, serves to
involve and invest the often isolated community. The sessions gather a
family and community tightly around the abuser and protectively around
victims.” 206 Now, pursuant to the Navajo Nation Code, domestic violence
cases may be referred by the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation to the
Peacemaker Program. 207 Referral is at the victim’s option, and the victim’s
consent must be given in writing. 208 At any time, the victim may choose to
have the petition removed to the Navajo Nation Family Court. 209
Peacemakers who handle domestic violence cases must have “received
specialized training in their primary language on the causes, symptoms and
dynamics of domestic abuse[.]” 210
Program administrators believe that the Peacemaking process is highly
effective in domestic violence cases: “From our observation, the various
203. Id. at 127 (noting that one Navajo judge discovered as a result of Peacemaking
referrals that many of the offenders appearing in her courtroom suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder, and began sending those offenders to traditional Navajo curing ceremonies).
204. PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 28.
205. Id.
206. Id. But see also Coker, supra note 192, at 89 n.440 (“Mediation’s privacy is also
criticized both because it fails to hold mediators accountable via public scrutiny and because
it recreates the privacy of the family, thus recreating norms of denial and minimization of
abuse.”).
207. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 1652 (1993).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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peacemaking practices work best in the most hazardous and emotionally
fraught situations such as domestic violence, which is considered
‘epidemic’ on our various reservations.” 211 Moreover, they believe that
effectiveness surpasses that of an adversarial court. 212 Chief Justice Yazzie
agrees that, due to its focus on family involvement and addressing denial,
Peacemaking can be particularly effective in domestic violence cases:
In a recent peacemaking involving domestic violence that took
place in our Tuba City court, the male batterer’s sister came in
with him. The defendant was full of denial; he made light of his
actions; and he blamed his wife for the whole thing. It was the
man’s sister who straightened him out. She told him he was
violent and that he must do something about his emotional state
and his drinking — to stop making excuses for his own actions.
She told him the traditional principles that he violated — that
Navajos believe in the dignity of women, so you must not hurt
them. She then offered to help him. She broke down his barrier
of denial and used her influence as a sister to deal with the
underlying problems. 213
The Peacemaking process then closes with reconciliation and consensus.
According to Chief Justice Yazzie, the reconciliation process focuses on:
“restor[ing] people to good relationships with each other.” 214 As for
consensus, Chief Justice Yazzie says that “the people themselves usually
reach a consensus about what to do. Planning is actually a central Navajo
justice concept, and the people plan a very practical resolution to the
problem.” 215 As part of the current process, an official Peacemaking
Agreement is written and signed by the parties.216 Resolution of the incident
often includes nalyeeh, which Chief Justice Yazzie says may imperfectly be

211. PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 27; see also Yazzie, Response to Crime,
supra note 187, at 132 (“People are using peacemaking for family squabbles, alcohol-related
behavior, family violence, and even such controversial things as sex offenses. It works.”).
212. PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 27 (“Domestic violence is an extreme
example of family discord in which peacemaking should be used to address urgent
situations. When family members become monsters to each other, the teachings that they
will need to change are seldom within the ability of the courts.”).
213. Yazzie, Response to Crime, supra note 187, at 126-27.
214. Id. at 127.
215. Id.
216. PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 45.
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translated into English as “restitution.” 217 “The offender’s relatives play a
very important part in nalyeeh. It is the families that actually provide the
money, horses, or goods. Once they have done that, they will keep an eye
on the offender to make certain that he or she will not offend again.” 218
For the Navajo Nation, the institutionalization of traditional
Peacemaking practices within the broader context of the Nation’s current
justice system has involved an ongoing process of defining and redefining
the relationship between peacemaking and the Navajo courts. That process
in turn has involved the complicated task of balancing the primary purpose
of the Peacemaking Program against the need for compatibility with other
components of the Nation’s current system, to say nothing of outside
entities. The Peacemaking Program’s existing Plan of Operations offers a
fairly detailed history of this process and a helpful, frank discussion of
some of the challenges faced:
The court that was created aspired to protect and support the
customary practice of peacemaking, hózhóji naat’aah, but also
imposed Anglo-American court-style procedural rules on hózhóji
naat’aah. The judicial institutionalization of hózhóji naat’aah
had the inadvertent consequence of changing its fundamental
nature.
Over thirty years, institutionalized hózhóji naat’aah more and
more resembled mediator-assisted settlement. Its teaching
component, its heroic component, and its dynamic life value
engagement component as hózhóji naat’aah were not included in
the peacemaker court rules and, over time, fell out of practice.
“Consent” to participate in the often emotional journey came to
be equated with the Anglo-American notion of “consent” to
lessen gains or losses through settlement. As a result of the rules,
the emotional component of peacemaking came to be viewed as

217. For an examination of the Navajo court system’s application of nalyeeh, see
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1047, 1080-85 (2005).
218. Yazzie, Response to Crime, supra note 187, at 129; see also Austin, American
Indian Customary Law, supra note 191, at 365 n.71 (“One Navajo common customary law
is nályééh (restitution). If there is an injury, the families of the tortfeasor and the injured get
together, talk over the problem, and agree on the amount of restitution to be paid to the
injured person.”).
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a complication that the peacemaker ought to quieten and
diffuse. 219
[Furthermore], over time, many courts began requiring the
Peacemaking Program to provide legal assistance to hózhóji
naat’aah participants and also began requiring peacemaking
agreements to be drafted in the style of legal documents. As the
legal demands of the courts grew, it became evident that the
program lacked the legal ability to provide such services and
should not do so. 220
The fact that the Peacemaking Program includes this history in its current
Plan of Operations suggests that the story provides, in the view of its
authors, lessons or considerations that are important to the successful
operation of the Program. Indeed, the narrative shows the Navajo Nation to
be wrestling with the types of challenges that many Indian tribes are likely
to face in their efforts to preserve, grow, or create alternatives to the
American federal and state justice model. These challenges, while relating
in this instance to the relationship between the Navajo Nation’s own courts
and its more traditional dispute resolution methods, shed light on similar
relationships between tribal justice systems and state and federal courts
with which they interact.
For the Navajo Peacemaking Program, the lessons of the last thirty years
suggest that preserving the freedom and autonomy of its traditional dispute
resolution process is one key piece in the puzzle: “[o]ver time, it has
become clear that the independence of the peacemakers needs to be
reinforced, the goal of peacemaking clarified, and the traditional
components of hózhóji naat’aah as a distinct and separate method need to
be restored for the traditional method’s effective and proper use.” 221
Nevertheless, autonomy does not necessarily mean isolation from or
incompatibility with contemporary institutions. On the one hand, the
Navajo Peacemaking rules were replaced with more flexible “guidelines,”
and the word “court,” which in English carries certain procedural and other
connotations, was dropped from the program’s title.222 On the other hand,
the Navajo Nation Council officially acted to acknowledge Diné
Fundamental Laws and to create the Peacemaking Division (which later
became the Peacemaking Program), and expanded the legal relationship of
219.
220.
221.
222.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS, supra note 182, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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peacemaking with other Navajo institutions through the codification of
laws. 223 In this way, contemporary, institutional methods were utilized to
further strengthen and protect the legitimacy of the traditional Peacemaking
process. 224 Challenges still exist for the Peacemaking Program, 225 and the
process is ongoing, but the program is widely recognized for the success
that it has achieved.226
B. Navajo Customary or Common Law
Even separate from, and prior to, the institutionalization of Navajo
Peacemaking, the Navajo Nation was implementing Navajo customary or
common law in the Navajo courts, including in criminal cases. For
example, in In re D.P., the Navajo District Court for the District of
Crownpoint looked to Navajo common law as well as statutory law in
evaluating a restitution order in the case of a minor found convicted of
armed robbery, unlawful use of a deadly weapon, and unauthorized use of
an automobile.227 The Judge observed the contrasting approaches of AngloEuropean and Navajo common law to restitution in criminal cases.
Specifically, the judge noted that the victim is largely removed from the
process in Anglo-European tradition, under which the government takes
restitution in the form of fines “as payment to protect the wrongdoers from
the vengeance of the victim.” 228 The Judge, however, applied Navajo law,
which he found differed substantially:
Under Navajo tradition, all offenses (with the exception of
witchcraft) were punished by payments to the victim or the
victim’s immediate family or clan. . . . In this case, robbery with
injury would be punished by a payment of ‘blood money’ to the
immediate family, plus a multiple payment for any property
taken. Theft would be punished by a multiple payment to the
victim or immediate family group.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 3.
226. See, e.g., Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 57, 87 (2007) (discussing the use of tribal custom
by tribal courts and noting that “[t]he experiences and advances made by [the Navajo] . . .
Nation’s courts are unprecedented in Indian tribal court history[.]”).
227. See, e.g., In re D.P., 11 Indian L. Rep. 6023, 6024 (Navajo D. Crownpoint 1982).
228. Id.
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The Navajo tradition recognizes that the central ideas of
punishment were to put the victim in the position he or she was
before the offense by a money payment, punish in a visible way
by requiring extra payments to the victim or the victim’s family
(rather than the king or state), and give a visible sign to the
community that wrong was punished. The offender was given
the means to return to the community by making good his or her
wrong. 229
Accordingly, the court found that “not only is restitution permitted under
Navajo custom law, but indeed it was so central to Navajo tradition in
offenses that it should be presumed to be required in any juvenile
disposition.” 230
In fact, Navajo statutory law has long provided courts must apply Navajo
custom where not prohibited by law. 231 More recently, in 2002, the Navajo
Nation Council passed a Resolution specifically recognizing Diné
Fundamental Law in the Navajo Nation Code. 232 That was followed in 2003
by an amendment to the choice of law statute applicable to the Navajo
Nation courts, as part of a broader update of the Judicial Code.233 That
choice of law statute now provides:
A. In all cases the courts of the Navajo Nation shall first apply
applicable Navajo Nation statutory laws and regulations to
229. Id. (internal citations omitted).
230. Id.
231. Prior to an amendment in 2003, title 7, section 204, of the Navajo Nation Code read
as follows:
A. In all cases the Courts of the Navajo Nation shall apply any laws of the
United States that may be applicable and any laws or customs of the Navajo
Nation not prohibited by applicable federal laws.
B. Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Navajo
Nation the court may request the advice of counselors familiar with these
customs and usages.
C. Any matters not covered by the traditional customs and usages or laws or
regulations of the Navajo Nation or by applicable federal laws and regulations,
may be decided by the Courts of the Navajo Nation according to the laws of the
state in which the matter in dispute may lie.
Resolution of the Navajo Nation Council CO-72-03, at exhibit A (Oct. 24, 2003) (showing
pre-amendment language of § 204), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/
CO-72-03CourtsAmend.pdf.
232. Resolution of the Navajo Nation Council CN-69-02 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/CN-69-02Dine.pdf.
233. Resolution of the Navajo Nation Council CO-72-03.
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resolve matters in dispute before the courts. The Courts shall
utilize Diné bi beenahaz’áanii (Navajo Traditional, Customary,
Natural or Common Law) to guide the interpretation of Navajo
Nation statutory laws and regulations. The courts shall also
utilize Diné bi beenahaz’áanii whenever Navajo Nation statutes
or regulations are silent on matters in dispute before the courts.
B. To determine the appropriate utilization and interpretation
of Diné bi beenahaz’áanii, the court shall request, as it deems
necessary, advice from Navajo individuals widely recognized as
being knowledgeable about Diné bi beenahaz’áanii.
C. The courts of the Navajo Nation shall apply federal laws or
regulations as may be applicable.
D. Any matters not addressed by Navajo Nation statutory
laws and regulations, Diné bi beenahaz’áanii or by applicable
federal laws and regulations, may be decided according to
comity with reference to the laws of the state in which the matter
in dispute may have arisen. 234
Accordingly, the interpretation of statutory law in the Navajo courts may
involve the application and interpretation of uniquely Navajo law and
custom — even when the statutory right at issue may be similar to a right
protected under United States federal law. In Navajo Nation v. Kelly, 235 for
example, the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation confronted the question
of whether a dual conviction for reckless driving and homicide by vehicle
would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy codified in the
Navajo Bill of Rights. 236 Noting that the term “double jeopardy” is
borrowed from federal law, the Court nevertheless observed that “[m]erely
because the Navajo Bill of Rights uses the same term does not mean that
the Court should simply adopt and apply federal interpretations. Though the
Court considers federal interpretations, the Court ultimately must interpret
the Bill of Rights consistent with Diné bi beenahaz’áanii.” 237
In contemplating the standard that ought to be applied in interpreting the
legislative intent of the double jeopardy prohibition, the Navajo Supreme
Court considered the traditional Navajo approach to dispute resolution and
the contemporary Peacemaking Program, which centers on voluntary
234.
235.
236.
237.

NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 204 (2009).
6 Am. Tribal Law 772 (Navajo 2006).
Id. at 776.
Id. at 777 (internal citations omitted).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

466

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

participation and resolution to restore harmony. 238 The court regarded
conviction and sentencing for a statutory criminal offense in that light:
As the functional equivalent of traditional resolution through an
agreement, a conviction and sentencing should be the final
resolution of the dispute caused by a defendant’s single action.
Multiple charges under multiple statutory offenses for a single
action undermine that finality, as conviction for a single offense
does not resolve the entire dispute. The Navajo Nation courts
therefore cannot lightly apply multiple statutory offenses to a
defendant’s single action. The Council must clearly intend the
separate offenses to punish separate conduct, and therefore
resolve separate disputes. Duncan, No. SC-CV-51-05, 5 Am.
Tribal Law at 465-66, 2004 WL 5658109 at *5-6 (as jury trial
reflects traditional Navajo values of participatory democracy,
Council may restrict that right only if intent is clear). The Court
will apply heightened scrutiny to provisions that allegedly create
separate offenses based on a single action, and in the absence of
clear intent that the statutory offenses indeed punish separate
conduct, multiple convictions for the same action will be barred
by double jeopardy. 239
The Navajo Supreme Court distinguished its approach from the United
States federal court approach under Blockburger v. United States: 240
The mere fact that the elements of the two or more statutory
offenses are fulfilled by a defendant’s action does not, by itself,
show clear intent. In other words, the mere fact that each offense
“requires proof of a fact which the other does not,” the
Blockburger test, alone does not establish clear intent. Because
the application of multiple criminal statutes to the same action
could be done for other purposes, such as enhancing the chances
for conviction or increasing the pressure on the defendant to
enter into a plea agreement — purposes other than the objective
of bee hózhó náhodoodleeł — the Court will scrutinize whether
the separate statues clearly evince different conduct. Therefore,
prosecutors must be aware that multiple charges arising out a
defendant’s single action may not allow multiple convictions, as
238. Id.
239. Id. at 777-78.
240. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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the offenses charged must clearly resolve separate conduct to not
violate a defendant’s double jeopardy right. 241
Finally, the Court noted the ways in which Navajo law protects the rights of
criminal defendants differently (and in this case, more stringently) than
federal law with regard to double jeopardy: “The Diné concept of ‘double
jeopardy’ also means that even if the Council creates two separate offenses
that clearly punish the same conduct, it cannot nonetheless mandate
multiple punishments, even if its intent is clear. Multiple punishments for
the same conduct are contrary to the Navajo concepts described above.” 242
The use of Navajo customary or common law thus ensures that Navajo
values are reflected even in the Navajo Nation’s more “Western”-style
courts.
According to the Department of Justice’s most recent Census of Tribal
Justice Agencies in Indian country, 175 federally-recognized Indian tribes
in the lower forty-eight states have a formal tribal court, while ninety-one
also have a court of appeals. 243 Not all tribes are able to incorporate tribal
customary law into their tribal court operation to the extent that the Navajo
Nation has – nor can one assume that every tribe would have the same
desire to do so. Further, “the customary laws of Indian tribes rarely (if ever)
apply to the disputes that involve non-Indians.” 244 Substantial obstacles
exist to the application of tribal customary law in tribal courts. 245
241. 6 Am. Tribal Law 772, 778 (Navajo 2006).
242. Id. Numerous other examples join those discussed here to illustrate the use of
Navajo custom or common law by the Navajo courts. See, e.g., Davis v. Means, 7 Navajo
Rptr. 100 (Navajo 1994) (applying Navajo custom to determine the best interests of the child
in a paternity suit); Apache v. Repub. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 3 Navajo Rptr. 250, 253-54 (Navajo
D. Ct. 1982) (resolving the question of whether a spouse named as an insurance beneficiary
lost the right to insurance due to a divorce with reference to the effect of divorce in Navajo
custom); see also NAVAJO NATION BAR ASS’N, NAVAJO COMMON LAW (collecting cases
regarding Navajo Common Law), available at http://www.navajolaw.org/navajo%20
common%20law/ncl.htm.
243. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE
AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002, at iii (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.
bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=543. This study did not include Alaska Native tribes:
while many Alaska Native tribes operate tribal courts, see, e.g., John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738
(Alaska 1999) (finding concurrent state and tribal court jurisdiction over a family law claim),
they tend to be smaller or more limited in scope than many tribal courts in the lower fortyeight states.
244. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law, supra note 221, at 63.
245. Id. at 82-84 (“Custom may be so ingrained in the language of the tribe that it cannot
be translated in an accurate or meaningful way into English”; tribal courts may employ nonmember judges unfamiliar with tribal values and practices; customary law may have “limited
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Nevertheless, in general “the importance of customary law in American
Indian tribal courts cannot be understated. Indian tribes now take every
measure conceivable to preserve Indigenous cultures and restore lost
cultural knowledge and practices.” 246 In doing so, tribes like the Navajo
Nation, and others discussed infra, seize on the opportunities they are
presented under the federal government’s self-determination policy and
develop robust, culturally sensitive tribal judiciaries even within the
confines of federal Indian law.
C. Tribal Court Common Law Under the Indian Civil Rights Act
Having glimpsed both the operation of an alternative tribal forum for
dispute resolution as well as the application of tribal common law in more
American-style courts through the example of the Navajo Nation, in this
section we broaden our analysis for a brief survey of tribal common law
applying federal law requirements in the criminal law context — namely,
the Indian Civil Rights Act.
This survey begins to illustrate how tribes are navigating the impositions
of federal Indian law within the context of their own justice systems; thus,
leaving their own fingerprints on the complex and contradictory
relationship between the two fields. Operating within the jurisdictional
limitations set by federal common law, tribal judiciaries must recognize the
requirements and incentives of federal legislation and resource
opportunities, in conjunction with considering whether or not the courts of
sister sovereigns will agree to uphold their resolutions if a tribal
adjudication strays from the “American” norm either in form or in
substance. They must do all of this while developing and applying tribal
law in a way that meets the unique needs of their tribal citizens and
community members and makes sense in the context of the tribe’s cultural
and historical existence.
Because the ICRA has been in effect since 1968, there is a sizeable body
of tribal law applying the statute. Other scholars have undertaken numerous
comprehensive reviews of tribal court decisions under ICRA, 247 and we do

utility in modern disputes” because it is either too vague or too specific; or it may no longer
“carry enough moral weight to legitimate its use”).
246. Id. at 60-61.
247. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law, 36 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 392 (2010); Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of QuasiConstitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 479 (2000); Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of
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not purport to do the same. Instead, our purpose is to consider more broadly
the lessons that these cases impart concerning tribes’ ability to address the
complex relationship between federal Indian law and tribal law.
At the outset, it is interesting to note that many tribes have passed
constitutions or ordinances explicitly authorizing tribal courts to apply state
or federal law when tribal law is not on point, or when doing so would
otherwise further the interests of justice, 248 whether out of concerns for
comity, to fill holes in tribal law, respect for precedent, or simple
convenience. It is often common practice for tribal courts to consult and
incorporate these sources of law when adjudicating disputes under ICRA. 249
Therefore, it is important to recognize that the application of non-tribal law
in tribal forums is not in and of itself necessarily or solely reflective of
federal coercion. Rather, many traditional tribal values echo Bill of Rights
requirements in spirit, and state and federal laws may encourage good
governance within tribal judiciaries by enforcing those values.
Regardless, many tribes have developed tribal glosses on the applicable
federal doctrines. For example, recognizing that ICRA does not require that
tribes provide attorneys to most criminal defendants, the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation Court of Appeals held that pursuant to
Townsend v. Burke, 250 Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 251 and United States v.
Tucker, 252 the tribal court could properly sentence a criminal defendant
after considering the defendant’s prior convictions, for which he had been
unrepresented by counsel, so long as the defendant had been advised of his

Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465 (1998); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts:
Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994).
248. See, e.g., WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.2(I); COLORADO RIVER
INDIAN TRIBES LAW & ORDER CODE art. 1, § 110(B).
249. See, e.g., Magee v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Ent., No. MPTC-CV-AA-2006150 (Mashantucket Pequot Aug. 31, 2007) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in the context of adjudicating due
process dispute); Komalestewa v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6213, 6214 (Hopi App. Ct.
1996) (“Hopi custom speaks to fairness, but it does not provide specific guidance for
defining when the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Therefore, we will consider
foreign law and apply it to the extent it is consistent with our customs, traditions and
culture.”).
250. 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (criminal sentence based on materially false assumptions about
defendant’s criminal record violated due process).
251. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding a constitutional right to an attorney in criminal cases).
252. 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (criminal sentence based on prior, unconstitutionally-obtained
convictions violated due process).
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right to counsel and had not had counsel improperly denied. 253 Other tribes
have held that ICRA’s free speech provision, which prohibits tribes from
making or enforcing “any law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” 254
quite literally prohibits speech restrictions found only in formal tribal
“laws,” and not general tribal actions 255 or employment policies. 256 This
reading departs from state and federal employee speech law, under which
the government’s attempt to restrict speech in any capacity is inherently a
First Amendment issue. 257
A second facet of tribal law in this context is the shaping of federal legal
principles through tribal customs and traditions. 258 The Navajo Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that “the Navajo concept of due process is
unique, in that it applies concepts of fairness consistent with Navajo values”
and that while “federal concepts of civil rights may be considered . . .
ultimately the rights set out in the Navajo Bill of Rights are to be
interpreted in light of Navajo Fundamental Law.”259 The Cheyenne River
Sioux Court of Appeals similarly overturned a garnishment determination
about which the garnishee had not been notified, reasoning that: “Lakota
tradition requires the respectful listening to the position of all interested
persons on any important issue” and that the lack of notice violated both
ICRA’s due process provision and “Lakota traditions of respect and
honor.” 260 The Hopi Court of Appeals premises its tribal comity analysis on
253. St. Peter v. Colville Confederated Tribes, CCAR 2 (Colville Confederated Sept. 28,
1993); see also In re D.H., 8 Am. Tribal Law 164, 166 (Grand Traverse Tribal Ct. 2009)
(finding that due process did not require provision of jury trial at child custody proceeding).
254. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (2012).
255. Fletcher v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, No. 3 Mash. 265 (Mashantucket Pequot
Tribal Ct. 1998) (rejecting tribal employee’s claim that he was impermissibly terminated for
publicly criticizing the tribe because “no Mashantucket Pequot tribal law is alleged to have
been enacted and/or enforced by the defendants in violation of the ICRA — which this Court
finds to be an essential element of an ICRA claim”).
256. See W.T. Creations v. Oneida Hiring Comm’n, No. 98-OHB-0009 (Oneida Ct. App.
1999) (holding that ICRA free speech provision did not apply to tribal non-disclosure
agreement).
257. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
258. See, e.g., Wagner v. Tulalip Housing Auth., No. TUL-EMP-12/00-418, 2001 WL
36211300, at *5 (Tulalip Court App. Oct. 2, 2001) (remanding case to district court for a
determination on Tulalip customary law concerning insubordination as part of due process
claim).
259. Navajo Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Schroeder, 7 Am. Tribal Law 516, 521 (Navajo
2007); accord id. at 521-22 (collecting cases applying Navajo traditional law to ICRA suits).
260. High Elk v. Veit, 6 Am. Tribal Law 73, 78, 80 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App.
2006).
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“concepts of harmony, accommodation, policy and compatibility,” and
whether the “foreign judgment accommodates and is compatible with the
Hopi laws, traditions and ‘notions of fairness,’” 261 while the Mille Lacs
Court of Appeals has analyzed its statute of limitation in the context of “sha
wa ni ma,” meaning, keeping the people together as one. Reasoning that the
statute of limitations “balances the rights of the individual with the needs of
the community for peace and harmony. It accomplishes this by allowing a
reasonable time period to bring actions before the Court while also ensuring
that the community will be able to move forward in achieving peace and
harmony by preventing perpetual disruptions in the circle of peace and
harmony.” 262
In other contexts and situations, like the Navajo Peacemaking Program
described supra, tribes defer entirely to traditional venues or dispute
resolution processes. Another example is the Mohegan Tribe operates a
Council of Elders that, in addition to various legislative, executive, and
cultural oversight functions, acts as the tribal court for non-gaming matters.
This civil adjudicatory system has been described as consistent “with
Mohegan custom and tradition” 263 and has been upheld under tribal law in
the face of arguments that the Council’s culturally-specific punishments
violate due process. 264 And on one occasion, the Cheyenne-Arapaho tribal
court simply chose not to adjudicate a dispute over the use and handling of
sacred tribal artifacts, leaving the determination to the political process and
reasoning that “tribal courts cannot merely simulate the state and federal
courts in interpreting and applying tribal laws. The Tribal Court has the
duty of incorporating centuries of customs and traditions within the
framework of the new Constitution” and that “Anglo-American concepts of
fairness and civil rights are sometimes inappropriate, in their raw form, to
Indian communities.” 265
When their legitimacy is challenged, tribal courts respond eloquently. In
Kelly v. Kelly, 266 a non-Indian involved in a divorce proceeding in his
261. Hopi Tribe v. Namoki, 5 Am. Tribal Law 238, 242 (Hopi Ct. App. 2004).
262. Kalk v. Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Corp. Com’n., No. 03 APP 03, 2004 WL
5746060, at *5-*6 (Mille Lacs Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004).
263. CONSTITUTION OF THE MOHEGAN TRIBE OF INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT art. X, § 2(d).
264. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut v. Mohegan Tribal Court, 8 Am. Tribal
Law 213, 222 (Mohegan Elders Council 2009) (punishments included exclusions from tribal
meetings and functions for one year, and an order to provide a written apology to the tribal
membership for the publication of private tribal information on a personal website.).
265. In re The Sacred Arrows, 3 Okla. Trib. 332, 337 (Chy.-Arapaho Tribes D. Ct.
1990).
266. No. DV 08-013, 2008 WL 7904116 (Stand. R. Sioux Trib. Ct. June 23, 2008).
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Indian wife’s tribal court condescendingly referred to the tribal court as a
“pawn” of his wife that would never grant him a fair trial.267 The tribal
court recognized that this attitude embodied “an unfortunate, but honestly,
not entirely surprising fear.” 268 The court pointed to language from a recent
federal court case where, in the context of a tribal comity analysis, the
federal court stated a tribe “is neither required nor expected to use the same
judicial procedures employed by federal courts, however, and federal courts
must take care not to exercise ‘unnecessary judicial paternalism in
derogation of tribal self-governance.’” 269 The tribal court responded:
But this is, itself, a paternalistic editorial comment. It is
condescending and patronizing. [Santa Clara Pueblo v.]
Martinez neither said, nor, in this Court’s analysis, implied that
Tribes may dispense with or curtail generally accepted notions of
due process or equal protection. . . . Indeed, this Tribe has gone
beyond the Indian Civil Rights Act and has ensconced the
guarantees of due process and equal protection in its own
Constitution, Article XI, Section 8: The Tribe shall not deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws
or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process.
To reiterate: “to any person within its jurisdiction.” If there is
any universally recognized cultural tradition among the Lakota,
Dakota and Nakota people, it is respect and fair dealing with all
people. It will be afforded to all who come before this Court. It
has been, in past cases, will be, in this case, and will continue, in
future cases, to be this Court’s position that all those who appear
before it are also entitled to at least as much due process and
equal protection as they would receive in a state or federal court,
under the Standing Rock Bill of Rights. 270
This reasoning is emblematic of the tension and harmony between
federal Indian law and tribal law: the latter continues to develop even
within the constraints of federal Indian law, as tribal judges and advocates
recognize the opportunities to reconcile federal constitutional values with
comparable tribal values of fairness, justice, and healing. In doing so, tribes
weigh every factor discussed in this article: on the one hand, pressure
267. Id. at *12.
268. Id.
269. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 890-91
(8th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
270. Kelly, 2008 WL 7904116 at *12.
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towards “Westernization,” concerns for comity, and funding limitations,
and on the other, the opportunities afforded under ICRA, the federal
government’s express policy of tribal self-governance and commitment to
the trust relationship, and the simple fact that tribal judiciaries act as some
of the most important outlets for tribes to strengthen their internal
governmental institutions in a culturally-appropriate manner.
V. Conclusion
Tribal justice systems have long shown the determination and ability to
develop and implement tribal law even within the strictures of federal
Indian law. As tribes begin to implement the newfound, statutorily
sanctioned jurisdiction under laws like the TLOA and VAWA, and find
themselves at the heart of a new spate of challenges towards tribal law and
culture, it will be increasingly important for both Congress and the federal
judiciary to truly embrace the policy of self-determination and give tribal
courts the opportunities needed to grow.
To this end, as federal Indian law seeks to balance support for distinctive
tribal justice systems in accordance with federal policy against the need to
protect the basic rights of all persons subject to any jurisdiction within the
United States, it may be useful to more carefully examine the true concerns
at stake and more thoughtfully evaluate the approaches that have been
taken. The desire to ensure basic fairness in criminal proceedings regardless
of the forum is surely valid. But how should that goal be accomplished in
light of the federal policy of self-determination and in the context of diverse
tribal cultures and circumstances? To what extent are measures, like the
constraints in section 904 of the VAWA, being adopted based on
reasonable fairness concerns as opposed to a general desire to press tribal
judiciaries to conform to Western cultural standards? 271
In the context of the VAWA, the solution adopted was to impose specific
protections from the United States Bill of Rights on tribal justice systems
exercising the VAWA’s expanded jurisdiction. In some instances, such an
approach may meet federal goals of protecting fairness. In others, it may
271. See Jonathan Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/politics/violenceagainst-women-act-held-up-by-tribal-land-issue.html?_r=0 (quoting Representative Tom
Cole of Oklahoma commenting on opposition to expanded tribal jurisdiction under the
VAWA, and stating that “some of his colleagues seem to ‘fear Indians are going to take out
500 years of mistreatment’” on non-Indians through the exercise of expanded criminal
jurisdiction, and calling the objections to tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians “fear,
veiled in constitutional theories[.]”).
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simply force tribes to adopt an adversarial justice model similar to federal
and state courts, along with the inherent disadvantages that such adversarial
systems carry for criminal defendants, without the full resources necessary
to implement counterbalancing protections in an effective manner.272 Stated
differently, it is worth remembering that federal constitutional protections
are designed for the adversarial system in and for which they were
developed. In such a system, they are necessary to achieve fairness for
criminal defendants and ensure the legitimacy of final judgments. But in
other kinds of justice systems, they may be neither necessary nor
appropriate for that purpose, at least in the same form as applied in state
and federal courts.
Consider, again, the Navajo Peacemaking Program. Many of the federal
constitutional protections extended under the VAWA, as normally
interpreted in state and federal courts, do not necessarily apply — the right
to counsel or to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community,
for instance. Instead, family members and other affected individuals
participate along with those directly involved in the conflict. Strictly
speaking, certain constitutional rights may not be granted to criminal
defendants participating in Peacemaking — but that does not mean that
Navajo Peacemaking is not fair or effective. On the contrary, the Navajo
Nation has found Peacemaking to be more effective than the adversarial
process for crimes of domestic violence in at least some instances.273 In
addition, Peacemaking benefits criminal offenders in ways that the
adversarial process usually does not, because it focuses on rehabilitation
and reintegration of the offender as a productive member of society
whenever possible. For exactly this reason, non-tribal entities seeking to
strengthen state and federal justice systems and address endemic crime and
violence in non-Indian communities are now looking to tribal justice
systems for inspiration and guidance, even as federal Indian law seeks to
influence tribal law and bring it into closer alignment with state and federal
ideals and practices.274
272. In a seminal study on tribal court practices and procedures, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights reported that congressional underfunding was the primary
restriction on the development of tribal courts, and called for an expansion of tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians to bolster tribal sovereignty and increase tribal court
sophistication. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 44, 72-73
(1991).
273. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
274. See Ctr. for Court Innovation, Widening the Circle: Can Peacemaking Work Outside
of Tribal Communities? A Guide for Planners and Policymakers (n.d.), available at
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Such is the paradox of the federal Indian law approach to tribal criminal
law: through laws and policies authorizing tribes to apply their customs and
traditions in a carefully limited manner, tribes potentially lose the ability to
develop legal systems that more robustly reflect their cultural values,
histories, and future goals even as they access expanded opportunities. The
federal government, as guardian to its tribal wards and as a proponent of
tribal self-determination, also potentially loses the opportunity to make
good these commitments by allowing traditional tribal justice systems to
develop as tribes see fit and to potentially outstrip the efficacy of their
ICRA-based counterparts. Finally, state and federal justice systems, along
with the communities they serve, potentially lose out on a valuable source
of alternative knowledge to strengthen their own justice systems and
societies as a whole. But at the same time, such concessions have proven
necessary for tribes to be given any opportunity at all to try non-Indians and
expand their jurisdiction.
In light of these considerations, it seems worth considering whether an
alternative model could address legitimate federal concerns while more
fully protecting meaningful tribal self-governance in the administration of
justice. Federal Indian law could, for example, move closer towards a
foreign comity approach with tribes. Both Congress and the courts could
ask whether tribal justice outcomes, on balance and in the context of the
tribal-specific culture and circumstances, are basically fair. Rather than
skittishly examining whether tribal courts are applying an “alien” tribal law
to a “federal” concept like due process (which itself cannot fairly be
classified as “federal” given the long tribal tradition of seeking fairness and
harmony in dispute resolutions), or seeking to impose tribal law on a nonIndian, Congress and the courts could ask whether defendants are afforded
the right to be heard, to defend themselves, and to seek justice? This is just
one of many ways to protect tribal flexibility while simultaneously ensuring
that criminal defendants are subject to fair treatment, and to do so in a way

http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/Widening_Circle.pdf; see also
Remarks of Attorney General Janet Reno, Strengthening Indian Nations Conference (Jan.
24, 1997) (“In addition to assuring safety and harmony in Indian country, traditional
mechanisms for dispute resolution offer fruitful alternatives to litigation for federal and state
courts to consider. Community-based peacemaking according to tribal tradition seeks to
resolve problems instead of processing cases in lengthy adversarial proceedings. As we gain
familiarity with tribal concepts of traditional justice and community, they will surely enrich
the administration of justice in America.”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (outlining both congressional and judicial
support for arbitration as an alternative to litigation).
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more consistent with stated federal Indian policy of self-determination and
self-governance.
For almost two centuries, the United States has recognized its trust
responsibility towards Indian tribes, and for almost forty years, has
expressly supported a policy of tribal self-governance. In doing so, the
federal government has both provided resources and worked to expand
tribal jurisdiction while simultaneously limiting that expansion,
conditioning those resources, and (implicitly or explicitly) promoting the
“Americanization” of tribal judiciaries. These federal Indian law dynamics
have existed uneasily with tribal law since the outset of the trust
relationship, and will continue to do so into the future so long as tribes
receive mixed messages as to whether their internal judiciaries could,
should, or must resemble their federal counterparts.
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